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COMMENTS
AN INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO AN IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PROCEEDING IN PENNSYLVANIA DIVORCE
LITIGATION - ANALYSIS AND A PROPOSAL
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the problems related to an indigent' instituting a divorce
action in Pennsylvania have long needed examination, the legal aspects
of this problem have hardly been documented much less resolved. The
reason for this neglect is a general indifference which pervades the entire
subject and which stifles the resolution of many of the indigents' problems related to obtaining divorces. The cause of this indifference was
highlighted by Judge Chauncey M. Depuy, Past Chairman of the Family
Law Section of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, when he stated:
The law of Domestic Relations and of Support is not a dramatic
part of the judicial edifice. It does not attract a lot of public attention or promise lucrative rewards to leaders of the Bar. Were we
discussing the law of constitutional safeguards for the criminal suspect, or the law of personal injuries built on frightful accidents and
astronomic verdict claims, or great anti-trust actions, there would,
I suppose, be a lot more activity on the part of lawyers, old or young,
trying to make a name for themselves. Quite modest rewards are
in line for those who
labor at repairing the torn and twisted fabric
2
of family discord.
However, despite this lack of attention in the past, there now appears
to be new interest arising in this area in light of the United States
Supreme Court's noting of probable jurisdiction to consider questions
of the right of a poor person to proceed in divorce without payment of
1. For the purpose of this Comment an indigent will be defined specifically as a
person who makes a gross income of less than eighty dollars per week. A family will
be deemed indigent if its total earnings are not more than ninety-five dollars gross
per week for two people, however, six dollars per week will be added for each additional dependent. A person or family will not be deemed indigent if he or they own
more than three hundred dollars in real estate (excluding a small equity in a home),
cash, securities; or in a bank account, or owning an automobile which is two years
old or less and is not necessary for the applicant's employment. This standard of
indigency is identical to the income qualification standards which are liberally applied
by the Legal Aid Society of Philadelphia in accepting applicants as clients.
For a discussion of indigency standards under federal law, see note 126 infra.
For a broader definition of indigency, see BLACK'S LAv DICTIONARY 913

(4th ed. 1951), which defines an indigent "[iun a general sense, as one who is needy
and poor, or one who has not sufficient property to furnish him a living nor anyone
able to support him to whom he is entitled to look for support."

2. Depuy, Some Proposals for Increasing the Effectiveness of Pennsylvania's
Domestic Relations Courts, 38 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 442, 443 (1967).

(283)
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court costs and fees. 3 Thus, the existing need and the present interest
make important a close examination of the present state and practice
of the divorce law in Pennsylvania as it affects indigents seeking divorces.
The examination shall begin with a discussion of the indigent's need
and desire for divorce and will be followed by a discussion of those procedural elements of Pennsylvania divorce law which create substantial
financial barriers to the indigent. In forma pauperis and legal aid services
in Pennsylvania and their relationship to divorce will then be analyzed.
Thereafter, constitutional and sociological considerations favoring the
right to in forma pauperis proceedings for indigents will be discussed.
Finally, proposals for eliminating cost barriers to the indigent's access
to the divorce courts will be advanced and analyzed.
II.

THE INDIGENT -

DOES

HE NEED AND DESIRE DIVORCE?

At the outset, it should be noted that the thesis of this Comment is
not concerned with the substantive law of divorce, 4 or with whether
divorce is a particularly effective mode of resolving the indigent's family
problems or whether divorces should be more liberally granted to the
lowest economic class than to any other class. Instead, what is urged
is that the indigent class be given the same access to the divorce courts
as that enjoyed by the more affluent. The absence of this equal access
is the focal point of this Comment.
In focusing upon the barriers to an indigent's access to the divorce
courts, it is appropriate to first determine whether he needs and desires
a divorce. Unfortunately, the true needs and desires of individuals are
difficult if not impossible to document, and this is especially true with
respect to indigent divorces. While there have been numerous sociological
studies concluding that there is a "generally inverse relationship between
3. Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968 (D.C. Conn. 1968), prob. juris. noted,

395 U.S. 974 (1969), restored to docket, 38 U.S.L.W. 3521 (U.S. June 30, 1970).
In Boddie, where several cases were consolidated, the plaintiffs filed divorce
complaints against their respective spouses in the Connecticut Superior Court, but
since the plaintiffs were indigent and could not pay the entry fee (forty-five dollars),
the sheriff's service fee (fifteen dollars average) and the publication fees, they filed
financial affidavits requesting the fees be waived. The superior court refused to hear
the motion on the basis that it did not have the authority to do so (Superior Court
Judge Joseph S. Longo, sitting on the Family Relations Session, April 2, 1968). The
plaintiffs then brought a civil rights action in the district court claiming that the
imposition of such fees on indigents was unconstitutional and requested that the State
of Connecticut be forced to accept the divorce complaint without the payment of fees.
The district court granted the state's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the legislature should provide the relief requested and that it was improper for them to act
in the absence of the legislature's action. 286 F. Supp. 968 (D.C. Conn. 1968). While
the district court noted the existence of a classification of civil suitors based on
financial ability to pay court costs, it added that:
[We do not feel that the present system, undesirable as it is, is a denial of a right
so fundamental that the Constitution, by the equal protection or due process clause,
forbids the state from its continuance.
286 F. Supp. at 973.
4. For a critical analysis of substantive divorce law of Pennsylvania, see Comment, Grounds and Defenses to Divorce in Pennsylvania, 15 VILL. L. REV. 155 (1969).
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economic position and proneness to divorce," 5 these studies, while somewhat applicable to indigents, are not truly indicative of the dimensions
of the indigent's divorce needs. Since the indigent has never been able
to afford divorce, it is impossible to arrive at an accurate statistical relationship between indigent marriages and divorces. 6 The indigent is often
faced with two alternatives: (1) live in his unhappy home; or (2) desert
his family. Needless to say, both activities are impossible to record
statistically. There are, however, clear indications that the indigent needs
access to divorce courts. The conclusion reached by the attorneys in
5. Goode, Economic Factors and Marital Stability, 16 AM. Soc.

802, 806
(1951). In this article Goode cites support for this general correlation REV.
in five other

independent studies. Id. In referring to one of these studies Goode stated:
This was essentially an ecological study, using data from the 1930 Census, and
it demonstrated clearly the relationship between low income and high divorce rate.
High mobility, dense population, and anonymity characterize the tracts with high
divorce rates, and it is almost unnecessary to point out that these are also areas
of low income.
Id. at 804.
Moreover, studies which have focused upon occupation indicate that the professionals, semi-professionals, and proprietors were the least prone to divorce,
laborers, service workers and semi-skilled are the most prone to divorce. Id. atwhile
805.
After compiling these results, Mr. Goode states that:
The statistical results at least suggest what common sense asserts, that economic factors may be of importance in marital stability. We are not surprised,
then, that economic matters occupy the top position in Terman's list of husbandwife complaints, or that Schroeder's list of "real causes" of divorce gives economic
factors as No. 2 or No. 1 depending on how they are regrouped.
Id. at 807. The author is referring to L. TERMAN, PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN
MARITAL HAPPINESS 105 (1938), and C. SCHROEDER, DIVORCE IN A CITY OF 100,000

POPULATION 106 (1939). Id. at 807 n.16.
6. See Kephart & Monahan, Desertion and Divorce in Philadelphia,
AM.
Soc. REV. 719 (1952); Kephart, Occupational Level and Marital Disruption, 17
20 AM.
Soc. REV. 456 (1955). This study recognized that:
When Philadelphia desertion cases were analyzed by occupational level, the idea
of the "poor man's divorce" failed to materialize, at least to the degree that had
been expected; in fact, when the bottom three occupational categories (service,
laborer, unemployed) are combined, the figures indicate that for whites these
groups are only slightly overrepresented in desertion cases, while among Negroes,
surprisingly, these categories are slightly underrepresented.
Id. at 464, 465.
However, the study went on to indicate that:
[The] findings raise a perplexing question, namely, what is the family stability
pattern of the lowest occupational level? Is it possible that this bottom socioeconomic rung maintains stronger family ties than has been supposed? This is
questionable in view of the marital-adjustment studies wherein a positive correlation is found between marital happiness and home ownership, steadiness of
income, etc.
Another possibility is underreporting; i.e., perhaps the lowest occupational
groups experience widespread desertions which are not reported in the same ratio
as the middle or upper occupational groups. Deserted wives in this instance may
not wish to see their husbands return and may not report their spouses to the
Court. This could account for the fact that among Negroes the lowest classes
are underrepresented in reported desertion cases, since in those groups the failure
of the husband to assume his marital responsibilities is still a lingering tradition.
Id. at 465;
But consider the fact that other factors related to economic level bear out the
conclusion that there is an inverse proportional relationship between income level and
the propensity for divorce. See also R. WILLIAMSON, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY RELATIONS 537 (1966), which indicates that the city dweller is more prone to divorce than
his rural counterpart, and that Negroes have a higher rate of divorce than whites.
See also Foster & Freed, Unequal Protection: Poverty and Family Law, 42 IND. L.J.
192, 196 (1967) ; and GOLDSTEIN & KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW 412-14 (1965),
which indicates that substandard housing is an important element in family breakdown.
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New York City's legal service program highlights this need. They
observed that the reason domestic relations cases (including divorces)
are the predominate legal aid requested by their clients is that their
clients' low income is a causal factor in breaking up their families.7
The extent of the indigent's need and desire for divorce is strongly
illustrated by several recent studies conducted to determine the nature
of the legal counselling most desired by indigents. One such study concerned the legal aid system which was put into effect in 1966 in 26
counties of Northern Wisconsin. This system, established by the Office
of Economic Opportunity, enabled the indigent to go to the lawyer of
his choice to receive whatever legal aid he desired without charge.8 "Of
the first 86 cases, 63 were divorce suits and 9 were custody and support
actions growing out of earlier divorces."
Similarly, in a recent survey analysis of the legal needs of the public,
Preble Stolz discussed two surveys which had endeavored to determine
the type of legal aid most desired by indigents.' 0 The first survey was
a compilation of the percentage of the types of cases handled by the
Legal Aid Office in Washington Township, Alameda County, California."
It was determined that 53.6 percent of the applicants for legal aid had
some sort of family law problem and that 38.8 percent had a problem
dealing expressly with divorce, annulment, or separate maintenance.
The second survey was based on data from the Annual Statistical Reports of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association which compiles reports from various legal aid offices throughout the country.' 2 The
average percentage of family law cases taken by all legal aid societies
filing reports from 1957 through 1966 was 42 percent. The percentage
taken by Philadelphia in 1966 was 26 percent, and the percentage taken
by Pittsburgh was 46 percent of their total caseloads. While both of
these surveys indicate the great desire of indigents to receive divorces as
well as other family law assistance, the figures given are not an exact
7. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13,
8. Graham, Judicare 1966, § 1, at 6, col. 5. This
services program, wherein the

1966, § 1, at 39, col. 3.

or How to Get a Free Divorce, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4,
system should be distinguished from the typical legal
poor person must go to a particular legal services law
office. Many legal service offices will not handle certain types of cases, most often

they exclude divorce cases.
9. Id. at col. 6:
Most American legal clinics either discourage or refuse divorce cases, yet 42
per cent of the total legal aid case load involve divorce. When England started its

Id.

[Judicare] program in 1950, 80 per cent of the clients wanted divorces.
Since then the rate of matrimonial disputes among English legal aid cases has
declined to about 40 per cent. Judicare officials predict that its high ratio of divorce
cases will go down as soon as the first rush for long-delayed divorces is over.

10. P. STOLZ, The Legal Needs of the Public: A Survey Analysis (1968)
(RESEARCH

CONTRIBUTIONS

[hereinafter cited as

OF

THE

AMERICAN

BAR

ASSOCIATION,

No. 4, 1968)

STOLZ].

11. STOLZ, supra note 10, at 8-9; citing The First Applicants to the Washington
Township Legal Assistance Office (Southern Alameda County, California), (Statistical
Memoranda, Mimeographed, 1966-67). The percentages compiled are based on the
first five hundred clients.
12. STOLZ, supra note 10, at 11-13; citing Legal Aid Statistics, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORTS,

NATIONAL LEGAL

AID

AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
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picture of the indigent's desire for divorce. Although legal aid offices do
provide free counsel, they usually do not pay court fees and costs with
the result being that the studies' figures do not reflect the number of
indigents who were discouraged from seeking free divorce counsel because of the requirement that they pay these costs.' 3 Nevertheless, the
available evidence does seem to support the conclusion that there is a
definite need and desire for divorce among the indigent class.
To further illustrate this need and desire for divorce and the problems arising from the indigent's difficulty in obtaining a divorce, the following actual case study is presented. 14 Mrs. C., who is almost 48 years
old, was separated from her husband, J., in 1942. In 1953, Mrs. C.
met Mr. M., and she has since bore him three children. In 1965, Mr. M.
became totally disabled, and, on the advice of the Board of Public
Assistance, Mrs. C. and Mr. M. took up residence together so that
she could give him the continuous care his condition requires. They are
prevented from becoming man and wife by virtue of Mrs. C.'s marriage
to her long unheard from husband. Moreover, Mrs. C. and Mr. M. have
been barred from public housing on the grounds they were not legally
married. Divorce and remarriage would remove this obstacle, but Mrs.
C. cannot afford a divorce. Although this is only one example, it is
reflective of the problems existing in many present situations.'
13. Realizing that he could not afford the divorce costs, the indigent could be

discouraged from even attempting to obtain the free legal counsel, or the indigent
might approach the legal aid office only to be informed that he must pay the costs of
litigation. In either case, the records of the legal aid office would not record this
individual as a client served. For a discussion of divorce litigation costs in Pennsylvania, see notes 17-36 infra and accompanying text.
14. This was a case study supplied by the Community Legal Services, Inc., of
Philspr'lnhia, Pennsylvania.
15. The following are two other case studies supplied by Community Legal
Services, Inc., which serve to illustrate the problems which permeate this area on an
individual level.
(I) Mrs. J. is twenty-six years old. She has two children by her husband,
who left her in July, 1961 after a period of domestic disharmony which resulted from
his refusal to support Mrs. J. and the children.
In 1963, after her husband's departure, Mrs. J. became close with Mr. T.,
whom she had known since she was thirteen years old. She and Mr. T. wished to
marry, but were barred by Mrs. J.'s inability to pay for a divorce. Mr. T. wanted to
adopt the children, if legally possible. Moreover, Mr. T.'s income of about sixty dollars
per week would probably have taken Mrs. J. and the children off public assistance,
which now pays her $90.10 every two weeks.
Unforunately, Mr. T. died, at age twenty-seven, on May 1, 1967. If Mr. T.
and Mrs. J. had been married, she would have been eligible for Social Security benefits
upon his death.
Although Mr. T. is dead, Mrs. J. still wants a divorce, so that she can continue with the "new start" in life first inspired by Mr. T. Since she is only twentysix, it is not unlikely that she will someday find another man with whom to share her
life. As part of this "new start" she has gone back to school, under Operation
Alphabet, in order to obtain her high school diploma. She hopes to become a surgical
technician or inhalation therapist. But Mrs. J. cannot afford a divorce.
(2) Mr. L. is a public assistance recipient with four minor children. Over
two years ago his wife departed without warning. Mr. L. has made arrangements to
purchase a small house for his family from the Philadelphia Housing Development
Corporation.
However, Mr. L. cannot get title insurance for the house, because his wife
would have an interest in any real property owned by him, and for that reason FHA
will not insure a mortgage for him. Mr. L. is thus precluded from participating in a
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Thus, it seems that it can reasonably be concluded from the above
discussion that indigents have a substantial need and desire for divorces
to both solve marital and other legal difficulties and to free themselves
from an unhappy marital bond. However, even if this need and desire
were only minimal, the financial barriers to divorce erected by the legal
system would be significant, and the need for reform urgent, in order
to protect the rights of those individual indigents' 6 who would otherwise seek a divorce if prohibitive costs were not involved.
III.

CosT

ANALYSIS OF DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS IN

PENNSYLVANIA

In the preceding discussion, much emphasis was placed on the cost
factor involved in obtaining divorces. In order to fully comprehend
these cost factors the divorce procedure in Pennsylvania must be examined, with particular attention being attributed to the expenses created by these procedures. The current statutory divorce provision,
enacted in 1929,17 provides a few divorce procedures which must be
followed, but, more importantly, delegates broad power to the common
pleas courts to create the necessary procedures, provided they do not
conflict with those procedures established by the state supreme court.' 8
In addition, the state supreme court is delegated the primary responsibility for establishing the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure which
govern much of the procedure related to divorce actions. 19 The following discussion of this procedure, in the order in which it would normally
be encountered by the divorce litigant, will suffice to explain both the
indigent's confusion over the myriad of technical aspects of divorce
procedure and his inability to surmount the financial barriers which
they erect.
The institution of a divorce action is governed by rule 1123 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure which states that "[a]n action
housing program which was designed to assist him, for the reason that he cannot
afford to get a divorce.
16. For an analysis of the indigents' constitutional right to free divorces, see
pp. 298-306 infra.
17. PA. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 1-69 (1965).
18. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 66 (1965), provides:
The several courts of common pleas are hereby authorized to make and adopt
such rules and practice as may be necessary to carry this act into effect, and to

regulate proceedings before masters, and to fix their fees.
Mr. Freedman, in commenting on Pennsylvania's divorce procedure stated:
The simplification of legal procedure, long advocated, is now an accepted fact.
The remedy most generally approved is the expansion of the rule-making power
of the courts. Through this device the remedy is entrusted to the judiciary, who
by training and experience are better able to establish and maintain it than is
the legislature in its biennial sessions.
2 A.

FREEDMAN

& M.

FREEDMAN, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN

PENNSYLVANIA

1030 (2d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as FREEDMAN]. This work is considered the
classic Pennsylvania treatise on family law.
19. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1121-36 suspend and supplement
the divorce law. Rule 1121(b) provides that, except as otherwise provided by the
rules, the procedure in divorce action shall be in accordance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure relating to an action in assumpsit. See generally 2 FREEDMAN, supra
note 18, at 1030-31.
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shall be commenced by filing a complaint with the prothonotary. '' 20 A
typical filing fee is fifteen dollars. 21 The complaint must be served by
the sheriff within thirty days of the filing.2 2 The procedure for service
is fixed by rule 1124 which requires personal service upon a defendant
inside the Commonwealth by the sheriff in any county of the Commonwealth, or by constables of the county in which the action is pending
if so authorized by local court rule. 28 Sheriff's fees can become quite
costly depending upon the distance of travel necessary to personally
serve the defendant. Typically, sheriff's fees range from eight to fifteen
dollars plus a set cost per mile travelling expense. 24 Service outside the
Commonwealth may be accomplished by having an attorney, other than
the plaintiff's attorney, personally serve the defendant, or by registered
mail. 25 Service by attorney, although expensive, is a sure means of
service, while service by registered mail is only valid where the return
receipt is personally signed by the defendant 26 who may avoid service
by simply refusing to accept the letter or to pick it up at the post office.
Service by publication is available either where the plaintiff cannot
make personal service on the defendant within the Commonwealth by
sheriff or constable, or chooses not to make service by attorney or registered mail outside the Commonwealth. 27 Since divorce, especially, among
the indigent, is the type of action where personal or registered mail
service is difficult due to the desertion factor, and, since service by attorney involves considerable expense, service through publication is very
often the only practical alternative. Costs for publication can run any20.

PA.

R. Cirv. P. 1123 (emphasis added).

21. A survey taken by the authors of this Comment indicates that filing fees
vary from $6.00 to $20.50.
In March of 1970 twenty-one community legal aid societies in various counties in Pennsylvania were sent a questionnaire concerning their use of in forma
pauperis proceedings in divorce (on file at Villanova Law Review office) [hereinafter
cited as Pennsylvania Survey]. From the thirteen responses received certain conclusions can be drawn. This survey will be cited occasionally throughout the text and
footnotes wherever appropriate.

22. Since the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's procedural divorce rules fix no
specific time limit for service, the general rules of assumpsit control, PA. R. Civ.
P. 1121 (1967). These rules require service within thirty days after filing, though
the complaint may be reinstated any number of times. PA. R. Cirv. P. 1009, 1010(b).
23. PA. R. Civ. P. 1124(a) (1), (2).
24. See Pennsylvania Survey, note 21 supra.
25. PA. R. Civ. P. 1124(a) (3) (a), (b).
26. PA. R. Civ. P. 1124(a) (3) (b). Also the use of registered mail within the
Commonwealth is invalid under the rules, thereby making impossible the elimination
of sheriff's fees in that situation. PA. R. Civ. P. 1124(a) (3) (b). See also Huntington
v. Huntington, 89 Pa. D. & C. 484 (Clinton County C.P. 1954).
27. PA. R. Civ. P. 1124(b), states:
If service cannot be made under Subdivision (a) (1) or (a) (2) of this rule
and has not been made under Subdivision (a) (3) of this rule, and the sheriff or
constable has made a return or affidavit of "Not Found," the plaintiff, without
reinstatement of the complaint, shall have the right of service by publication. The
prothonotary, upon the filing of a praecipe for publication, shall write on the
complaint "Service by Publication Directed." Publication shall be made by the
sheriff once a week for three successive weeks in such manner as the court by
general rule or special order shall direct. If service is made by publication, the
sheriff shall send the defendant a notice of the pendency of the action by registered mail to his last known residence set forth in the complaint.
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where from twenty-five to one hundred and fifty dollars depending on
28
the space charges levied by the local newspaper.
Once the complaint is filed and notice has been served, the rules
29
of civil procedure provide that when the divorce action is at issue,
and upon the motion of either party, a master" ° may be appointed who
will hear, as a substitute for a court hearing by a judge, the testimony
of the parties. 31 A transcript of this hearing is then forwarded to the
court along with the master's report and recommendation for the judge's
consideration. The extent of the expense created by the master system
will vary from county to county since each common pleas court is authorized by the Act of 192932 to establish its own master's fees.83 Our
28. See Pennsylvania Survey, supra note 21.
publication, see pp. 314-19 infra.

For a discussion of notice by

29. The rules provide that the divorce action is at issue when an answer has been

filed or, in the event of no answer, either twenty days after personal service or completed service by publication. PA. R. Civ. P. 1131.

30. While rule 1133(a) allows the judge to hear the divorce himself, that course

is very seldom followed because "[ihe bulk of the administration of the Pennsylvania
divorce law is done by masters." Comment, The Administration of Divorce: A
Philadelphia Study, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1204, 1208 (1953). For a criticism of the
master system, see Comment, supra, at 1223.
The mastership system was not originally a statutorily mandated procedure.
In Middleton v. Middleton, 187 Pa. 612, 614, 41 A. 291 (1898), the state supreme
court held that "[w]hile the court may appoint an examiner to take testimony and
report it, there is no authority under the act to appoint a master to find facts and
suggest a decree." The following year the legislature expressly authorized appointment of a master with such powers. ACT OF MARCH 10, 1899, Pub. L. 8 (repealed
1911). See 3 FREEDMAN, supra note 18, at 1233-34.
There was no statutory requirement that a master be a member of the bar.
but in Langeland v. Langeland, 108 Pa. Super. 375, 377, 164 A. 816, 817 (1933), the
superior court declared that no one other than an attorney should be appointed to be
a master. In addition some local rules specifically require this.
In Philadelphia County an uncontested divorce is almost invariably heard by
a master, and masters are also quite commonly appointed in contested cases. See
Comment, supra, at 1208.
31. PA. R. Civ. P. 1133(a).
32. PA. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 1-69 (1965).
33. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 66 (1965). While masters' fees are set by the county,
additional compensation may be awarded by the local court in its discretion. Rule
1133(a) (2) (b) of the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court states, inter alia:
The sum of $188.50 shall be deposited with the prothonotary when the motion
for the appointment of a master is made, $15 thereof to be paid forthwith by
the prothonotary to the Philadelphia Bar Association, $13.50 to be retained by
the prothonotary on account of final decree costs, $135 thereof, less poundage,
to be applied as compensation to the master for his services, and $25 thereof as
minimum compensation to the official court stenographer appointed in the case
for the original notes of testimony transcribed and filed by him.
The Philadelphia Bar Association has been accused of using the fifteen dollars per
divorce to finance its midtown luncheon club; M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH
LAWYERs 60 (1968), a less than worthwhile use considering the added burden it
places on the divorce plaintiff.
PHILA. C. P. RULE 1133(a) 2(b) further provides, inter alia, that "[n]o
additional compensation shall be paid to or received by the master, except after the
filing of the master's report, upon petition and rule of the master therefor, and
express allowance by the court." Cf. Bair v. Bair, 3 Chester County Rep. 234 (1947)
see also 3 FREEDMAN, supra note 18, at 1254-56.
All the procedural costs may be thrust upon the losing party. The divorce
law states that "[ihe court may award costs to the party in whose behalf the sentence or decree shall pass, or may order that each party shall pay his or her own
costs, as to it shall appear to be just and reasonable." PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 56 (1965).
However, in the case of indigents both parties are usually unable to pay costs. While
the court is authorized to make all costs payable by the losing party, or require each
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Pennsylvania Survey indicates that masters fees range from seventy-five
to one hundred and fifty dollars and that all counties use the system
in both contested and uncontested divorces. Furthermore, since the
testimony taken at the master's hearing is charged to the plaintiff,
stenographer's fees create another expense.3 4 In addition to the above
costs, numerous other filing costs, although less significant, may also
5
arise during the passage of litigation.3
Moreover, in addition to those costs which arise through statute
or court authority derived therefrom, counsel fees and other nonparty to pay for his own costs, it is significant to note that it cannot require the
successful party to pay for the costs of the losing party. Id. For a more detailed
discussion of costs, see 3 FREEDMAN, supra note 18, at 1294.
34. Stenographers' fees arising from the master's hearing run at least twenty-five
dollars and possibly more depending on the length of the transcript. See Pennsylvania
Survey, note 21 supra.
35. Additional litigation fees, expenses and costs which are required by statute
and ordinance in Philadelphia County to be paid to the Prothonotary are as follows:
Acceptance of service----- $ .50
Indexing action
$ .50
Answer
.50
Indexing decree
........
50
Bill of Particulars...
. .50
Motion and Appointment
Certificate of Divorce or
of Master
-....
1.00
Annulment
8.50
Non-military affidavit-..50
Complaint
2.50
Statistical report to DeDirection for Publication
partment of Health---.50
including return of
Warrant of Attorney, inservice
____
1.00
eluding appearance .
1.50
Entering a Decree In
Filing an afdavit-.....
.50
Divorce or Annulment1.00
Petition
1.50
Final Costs.
13.50
Filing a rule as of course
.50
The authority for the courts fixing these costs arises from PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 1589.1
(supp. 1963).
It is also important to note that where the wife is the plaintiff in the divorce
action the defendant husband will be required to pay all the costs. 2 FREEDMAN, supra
note 18, at 978. See also 2 FREEDMAN, supra note 18, at 983, for a list of expenses
found allowable to the wife by various Pennsylvania courts. Included are the wife's

traveling expenses, board and lodging and subsistence during the hearing; similar
expenses are allowed for her witnesses, counsel expenses, and expert witness fees.
In addition the wife may receive an allowance from her husband for such
expenses during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. "In case of divorce ... the
court may, upon petition, in proper cases, allow a wife reasonable alimony pendente
lite and reasonable counsel fees and expenses." PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 46 (1965).
The distinction between costs and expenses is confusing. Under section 46

the wife is allowed from the husband all reasonable expenses incurred in the divorce
suit. Part of these expenses may be "costs," such as master's fee, or sheriff's fee.
However, since "costs" of the losing party cannot be placed on the successful party,
see note 33 supra; if the wife loses the suit, her husband can recover from her the
"costs" - part of the expenses he was required to give her under section 46. See
2 FREEDMAN, supra note 18, at 984-86.
Many Pennsylvania courts base such allowance of expenses upon professed
elementary principles of justice. See 2 FREEDMAN, supra note 18, at 978-79. See also
York v. York, 107 Pa. Super. 522, 164 A. 87 (1933) ; Kaufman v. Kaufman, 76 Pa.
Super. 603 (1921) ; Hartje v. Hartje, 39 Pa. Super. 490 (1909) ; Greegor v. Greegor,
54 D. & C. 383 (Dauphin County C.P. 1945).
As early as 1843, before adoption by the divorce law, PA. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 1-69
(1964), it was stated that:
[T]he husband is obliged to pay the expenses incurred by his wife in prosecuting
or defending a divorce ....
It is an incidental authority to the power given this
Court to decree a divorce. Without it, in many cases, the wife being in poverty,
must fail in a just suit instituted by her, or be defeated in an unjust one prosecuted
by her husband against her.
I Pars. Eq. Cas. 77 (1843).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court later agreed, stating: "[t]his rule is necessary; otherwise she might be denied justice for want of the funds required for the
vindication of her rights." Graves v. Cole, 19 Pa. 171, 173 (1852).
Obviously, the wife's right to have her costs paid is going to be valueless if
the husband is indigent or if he has deserted her and cannot be subjected to court order.
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statutory expenses - e.g., transcript and detective fees - arise naturally
out of divorce proceedings. The complexity of the proceedings inevitably
require anyone seeking or defending against a divorce to turn to legal
counsel, which is at least as expensive as all the other costs put together,
thus creating by itself a substantial financial barrier to the indigent.3 6
IV.

AVAILABLE STRUCTURES TO ENABLE INDIGENTS TO AVOID
DIVORCE COSTS

While the existence of the previously discussed cost factors bar the
indigent from commencing divorce actions, there are structures currently
existing which are designed to remove these cost barriers. Unfortunately,
while these structures are theoretically available to the indigent, in reality,
they are not accessible to an indigent seeking a divorce.
A.

In Forma Pauperis Proceedings

The primary source of relief from the statutory and procedural
costs accompanying a divorce action which could be available to the
indigent is the proceeding in forma pauperis.3 7 The first comprehensive
in forma pauperis legislation was an English statute popularly known
as the Statute of Henry VII.3 8 This statute entitled "[a]n Act to admit
such persons as are poor to sue in forma pauperis" provided that one
who proved his poverty to the satisfaction of the chancellor could have
an original writ, writs of subpoena for witnesses, and appointment of
counsel without cost.3 9
36. The Pennsylvania Survey indicates that attorneys' fees in divorce proceedings

amount to at least three hundred dollars plus costs. See note 21 supra.
37. While there is no precise definition of what constitutes proceeding in forma
pauperis, for the purposes of this Comment it will be defined as a proceeding which
relieves the indigent plaintiff of all court costs, fees, publication expenses but not
counsel fees which arise from the legal proceeding. This definition more or less conforms to the definition of in forma pauperis propounded by BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
895 (4th ed. 1951) which defines the term as that which "describes permission given
to a poor person to sue without liability for costs."
38. 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 (1495).
39. The Statute of Henry VII dictates:
That every poor person or persons, which have, or hereafter shall have cause
of action or actions against any person or persons within this realm, shall have,
by the discretion of the chancellor of this realm . . . , writ or writs original, and
writs of subpoena, according to the nature of their causes, therefor nothing
paying . . . for the seals of the same, nor to any person for the writing of the
same writ and writs to be hereafter sued; and that the said chancellor . . . shall
assign such of the clerks which shall do and use the making and writing of the
same writs, to write the same ready to be sealed, and also learned counsel and
attorneys for the same, without any reward taken therefor; and after the said
writ or writs be returned, if it be afore the king in his bench, the justices there
shall assign to the same poor person or persons, counsel learned, by their discretions, which shall give their counsels nothing taking for the same: And likewise
the justices shall appoint attorney and attorneys for the same poor person or
persons, and all other officers requisite and necessary to be had for the speed
of the said suits to be had and made, which shall do their duties without any
reward for their counsels, help and business in the same: And the same law and
order shall be observed and kept of all such suits to be made afore the king's
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While about one-half of the states and the federal government
have enacted some form of in forma pauperis statute,40 Pennsylvania
has not. However, in forma pauperis exists in the Commonwealth by
virtue of Pennsylvania's adoption of English statutes and common law.
This adoption is expressely authorized by a Pennsylvania statute, commonly known as the Reception Statute, entitled "Revival of Provincial
Laws; English Common Law and Statutes."' 4 1 The Statute of Henry
VII was explicitly incorporated into Pennsylvania law under this statute by the Judges of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania who were commissioned by the legislature, pursuant to the Reception Statute, to report on all English laws which were being incorporated into the law
of Pennsylvania. 42 Pennsylvania case law has recognized this incorporation. In the case of Cowan v. City of Chester43 the court unequivocally
stated that :
[Als early as 1496, in the eleventh year of the reign of Henry VII.,
a statute gave the Chancellor jurisdiction to decree poor plaintiffs
to be entitled to sue in forma pauperis, and in that capacity command the services, not only of the officers of the court, and attendance of witnesses, without pay, but to require the court to assign
them counsel gratis. This statute is in force in this State. The
court in which the action is brought, exercises the power of chancellor, and when a plaintiff is proved too poor to pay costs or to
give security
for them, he has the right to prosecute his suit free
44
from costs.

Thus, there is clear authority supporting in forma pauperis proceedings
in Pennsylvania's civil actions as a matter of right.
Moreover, the proposition that proceedings in forma pauperis, as
adopted by the common law of Pennsylvania, extend to divorce proceedings has recently found judicial support. In Cunha v. Cunha,45 the Court
justices of his common place, and barons of his exchequer, and all other justices
in the courts of record where any such suits shall be.
3 FREEDMAN, supra note 18, at 1300-01, citing ROBERTS, DIGEST OF BRITISH STATUTES
116-17 (2d ed. 1847).
40. See Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor
Persons in Civil Cases, 2 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 21, 33 (1967).
41. PA. STAT. tit. 46, § 152 (1969), states that:
IN FORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA

Each and every one of the laws or acts of general assembly, that were in force
and binding on the inhabitants of the said province on the 14th day of May last,
shall be in force and binding on the inhabitants of this state, from and after the
10th day of February next, as fully and effectually, to all intents and purposes,
as if the said laws and each of them, had been made or enacted by this general

assembly: . . .and the common law and such of the statute laws of England, as
have, heretofore been in force in the said province ...
The Pennsylvania courts have recognized this general incorporation. E.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 67 Pa. D. & C. 598, 602 (Dauphin County C.P. 1949), where the
court stated: "[W]e might add that under the Act of January 28, 1777, 1 Sm. L. 429,
§ 2, 46 P.S. 152, the English common law became the law of this Commonwealth. ..
42. 3 Binn. 593, 617 (Pa. 1808).
43. 2 Delaware County Rep. 234 (1884). This case involved a rule for an appeal
in forma pauperis from an arbitration judgment in a negligence case.
44. Id. at 235 (emphasis added).

45. 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 230 (Lebanon County C.P. 1968).
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of Common Pleas of Lebanon County in allowing the plaintiff-wife to
proceed in forma pauperis in divorce, stated that:
If our courts are to be open to all people regardless of their means,
then the form of action should not be inquired into.
Certainly, plaintiff should have the right to enjoy companionship, now prohibited to her if she respects the vows she took, which
could look toward a happy marriage. It appears that, through no
fault of her own, her right of support is gone and her children
have no father to guide them through the formative years. Should
she then be deprived of the opportunity to change or correct the
situation brought about by an absconding
husband because she is
46
impecunious? We do not think so.

Another Pennsylvania common pleas court has gone further, holding that it was the responsibility of the court to appoint free counsel
for the defendant in a divorce action where neither she nor the plaintiff
could afford to provide her with counsel and where legal aid services
were not available. 47 The court stated that elementary principles of
justice 48 dictate that the plaintiff have the right to be relieved from
paying litigation expenses and held that in this situation it was the responsibility of the court and the bar to see that counsel is available
for a wife unable to employ one. 49 The court further added that "Lt]here
can be no equality before the law unless representation is afforded to
0
those persons who are financially unable to afford a lawyer."
Despite such lower court decisions supporting in forma pauperis
divorce proceedings, there has been no declaration by the highest courts
of Pennsylvania that the indigent have a constitutionally-guaranteed
right in divorce actions to proceed in forma pauperis. Rather it appears
that the allowance of such a proceeding is within the discretion of the
court."' In a recent divorce case, the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas held that there was "no right in a civil action to proceed in
forma pauperis or to have free counsel appointed ....
52 The court
46. Id. at 232.
47. Kelly v. Kelly, 45 Pa. D. & C.2d 299 (Huntington County C.P. 1968).
48. Id. at 303.
49. Id. at 304.
50. Id.
51. Id. In essence the courts consider leave to proceed in forma pauperis a
privilege to be granted or denied in their discretion. This discretionary power of the
court should be distinguished from the discretion exercised by the court in determining whether the party is, in fact, an indigent and thus qualifies to proceed in iorma
pauperis. See note 1 supra.
52. Shank v. Shank, 45 Pa. D. & C.2d 242, 244 (Lancaster County C.P. 1967)
(emphasis added). While this case may be unique in that the plaintiff-wife was suing
for divorce on the statutory grounds of the defendant-husband's conviction of rape
for a term in excess of two years - to which no defense seems conceivable - the
court plainly stated that there is no right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil actions.
The view that in forma pauperis is a privilege and not a right is shared by
the federal courts, which operate under their particular in forma pauperis statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964). See Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts,
18 STAN. L. REv. 1270, 1279 (1966). See note 126 infra, where the statute is quoted
in full and is discussed.
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the defendant was obviously confusing "his rights in this
with the extensive rights granted to those accused or concrime." 53 Moreover, it would appear that the. judges are
exercise their discretion to authorize proceedings in forma

pauperis in divorce suits5 4 primarily because of court backlogs involving

cases which they feel are of a higher priority than divorce actions. 55 A
second reason for the paucity of such judicial orders is that divorces are
ofter considered a luxury and the judges feel that the state should not
be required to subsidize the poor's luxuries when it is already financing
and directing much effort toward preserving what are considered to be
the more important rights of the poor in the areas of juvenile and criminal law. 56

The above attitudes have made it difficult if not impossible for
indigents to proceed in forma pauperis. In Philadelphia County, for
example, although in forma pauperis proceedings are available through
the discretion of the family court, the plaintiff is required when seeking
an order to proceed in forma pauperis to submit evidence that he has
made a good faith attempt to determine that the defendant's financial
status is that of an indigent. 7 The objective of this requirement is to
determine if the defendant would be able to pay the costs and expenses
of the divorce when ordered to do so by the court, thus relieving the
state of the cost of litigating the suit at its own expense. However, the
unfortunate effect of this order is that it places a substantial procedural
burden upon the indigent in his attempt to obtain an order to proceed
53. 45 Pa. D. & C.2d at 244.
54. The Pennsylvania Survey indicated only two counties granted in forma
pauperis proceedings in divorce cases where requested by the legal aid society (only
eight handle divorces at all) and these two organizations stated that the number of
such divorces granted were "minute" and "negligible." See note 21 supra.
55. Such action by the judiciary cannot be condemned in light of their good faith
motivation to keep the wheels of justice moving swiftly. If they were not selective in
taking cases and discouraging trials the courts' backlogs would greatly increase. It is
submitted, however, that the resolution of the backlog problem requires the appointment of more judges and setting up more courts, and not denying indigent's access to
the court. Currently there has been considerable interest in appointing more judges.
Eg., Station WFIL-TV in Philadelphia throughout September of 1970 campaigned
through editorials and panel discussions to achieve the institution of thirty new judgeships in Philadelphia in order to reduce the backlog and to meet the mounting flow
of new cases.

56. The Pennsylvania Common Pleas court of Lebanon County recognized this
view and its superficiality in Cunha v. Cunha, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 230, 231 (Lebanon
County C.P. 1968). The court stated: "It may at first blush appear that the right to
secure a divorce is a luxury which should not be permitted without the payment of
all costs."
57. See the comments of Judge Montemuro, head of the family court in Philadelphia County, in denying a petition to reconsider his order requiring that all
plaintiffs requesting in forma pauperis proceedings in divorce cases make a good faith
effort to determine the indigency of the defendant in their case. The order accompanied Judge Montemuro's setting a date for hearing the petition requesting in forma
pauperis divorce proceedings, in the cases of Robinson v. Robinson, No. 2924, Philadelphia County C.P. Nov. Term 1969; Hayes v. Hayes, No. 2766, Philadelphia County
C.P. Dec. Term 1969; Jones v. Jones, No. 6235, Philadelphia County C.P. Dec.
Term 1969. The original order was dated March 20, 1970, petition for reconsideration
was argued April 20, 1970, and the order denying petition for reconsideration was
issued May 1, 1970.
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in forma pauperis. Not only is the "good faith investigation" requirement time-consuming, but, where the defendant has deserted the plaintiff,
it may be impossible to satisfy.5"
B.

Legal Aid Societies

Another source which could be utilized to alleviate many of the costs
involved in divorce actions by providing the indigent with free legal
services are legal aid societies. Unfortunately, like proceedings in forma
pauperis, these societies have afforded the indigent divorce claimant
little assistance.
The reason for this failure lies in an examination of the hierarchy
of the supervisory organizations which control the scope of the legal
activities undertaken by the various legal aid organizations. The ultimate authority governing formal policy is the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) which supplies all or most of the funds utilized by
the societies. Rather than setting down specific requirements which
must be met before a society may receive Federal aid, OEO has been
content to establish a generalized criteria for the qualification of legal
aid programs.59 This present policy of OEO enables the local bar
58. As John Sturgis, the senior investigator of Community Legal Services, Inc.,
of Philadelphia indicated, where the defendant is uncooperative as is usually the case,
obtaining financial data about him would require considerable time and effort in
following him and making investigation pursuant thereto. Sworn affidavit constituting
Exhibit E in the petition to reconsider the judicial order in the Robinson, Hayes and
Jones cases (see note 57 supra). The investigators of legal aid societies are not able
to invest that sort of time for a mere qualification to proceed in forma pauperis since
these societies are so understaffed; thus the indigent is faced with the costly and
patently unfeasible alternative of hiring private detectives.
59. See I CCH Pov. L. REP. 111
6700.10 et seq. (1970).
A national program to provide funds for legal service programs for the poor
has been established by the Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. 2809(a) (3)
(Supp. V 1970). The Office of Economic Opportunity, established pursuant to that
Act, has the authority to provide financial aid to programs and projects which meet
its guidelines in providing legal services for the poor. 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. f[ 6010
(1970).
The overall objectives of OEO's Legal Service Program are as follows:
First: To make funds available to implement efforts initiated and designed
by local communities to provide the advice and advocacy of lawyers for people
in poverty.
Second: To accumulate empirical knowledge to find the most effective method
to bring the aid of the law and the assistance of lawyers to the economically
disadvantaged people of this nation. OEO will encourage and support experiment
and innovation in legal services proposals to find the best method.
Third: To sponsor education and research in the areas of procedural and
substantive law which affect the causes and problems of poverty.
Fourth: To acquaint the whole practicing bar with its essential role in combating poverty and provide the resources to meet the response of lawyers to be
involved in the War on Poverty.
Fifth: To finance programs to teach the poor and those who work with the
poor to recognize problems which can be resolved best by the law and lawyers.
The poor do not always know when their problems are legal problems and they
may be unable, reluctant, or unwilling to seek the aid of a lawyer.
I CCH Pov. L. REP. f"6010 (1970) (Legal Services Program). These purposes are
also stated under the OEO Guidelines for Legal Services, 1 CCH Pov. L. REP.
q 6700.10 (1970). OEO in an effort to be consistent with these objectives has estab-
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association and the board of trustees of the particular soiety -- the
supervisory bodies directly controlling the individual organizations to step into this void and set forth regulations preventing the societies
from taking divorce cases.
The bar association observes the activities of legal aid societies to
insure that they do not conflict with the services provided by the rest
of the profession. 0 Unfortunately, this power has led the local bar to
forbid legal aid societies from processing any divorce cases at all or
to severely restrict their authority in many counties in Pennsylvania.
The local bar associations, like many judges, consider divorce a luxury,
and take the attitude that if a person really wants a divorce he will
find the resources to pay for it."1

In addition the boards of trustees which supervise the day-to-day
conduct of the legal aid offices are composed of members of the bar
who have an obligation to abide by the bar association's decisions as
well as to maintain a friendly relationship for the sake of efficient operations. These considerations tend to create reluctance on the part of the
boards to take a position that is antagonistic to the bar. To further
add to the complexity of this problem, there is a strong likelihood that
many of the boards of the Legal Aid societies do not want to take
divorce cases because their resources are limited and other civil prob62
lems are considered to have a higher priority than divorce litigation.
The effect of these considerations on actual practice is illustrated
by a recent national study of legal aid services where it was found that
only one office in three has an open policy toward divorce cases, 3 and
that many of those offices are unduly selective in determining which
cases are worthy of their services. 4 From the responses which we received from the Pennsylvania Survey it appears that the practice in
lished a broad scope of legal services which should be rendered by organizations
receiving federal funds. In describing this scope it has been stated that:
[t]here should not be an arbitrary limit to the scope or type of civil legal
services provided to eligible clients. All areas of the civil law should be included
and a full spectrum of legal work should be provided: advice, representation,
litigation, and appeal.
1 CCH Pov. L. REP. 116700.36 (1970) (OEO Guidelines for Legal Services Programs).
60. The Philadelphia Bar has established a subcommittee of its Public Service
Committee called the Community Legal Services Committee (previously the "Watchdog" committee) one of whose functions it is to observe the legal aid offices in
Philadelphia to determine if they are accepting cases which infringe on the practices
of the other members of the bar. If such infringement were discovered, the bar would
communicate with the particular office and lawyers involved to discuss the infringement. If an arrangement were not worked out to the satisfaction of the Bar Association, the Association's Committee of Censures could take disciplinary action against
the lawyers involved by filing a complaint against them in the Court of Common

Pleas.

PHILA.

R. Civ. P. 200(d) (1).

61. E.g., the Dauphin County Bar Association does not permit the legal aid
societies in that county to handle divorces. Pennsylvania Survey, note 21 supra.
62. There is a tendency on the part of many lawyers to treat divorces as a luxury
and thus to treat them as low priority. See note 56 supra. See Pennsylvania Survey,
response from Cambria County Office of Legal Aid, Inc., note 21 supra. This attitude
would be likely to permeate the legal aid societies themselves especially when great
caseloads demand that priorities be set.
63. See 44 J. URBAN LAW 549, 581 (1967).
64. Id. at 574.
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Pennsylvania is more liberal than that described above since threeforths of the legal aid societies responding reported that they take
divorce cases. 65 However, most of those legal aid societies indicating
that they process divorces have restrictions or requirements beyond
the normal standard of indigency employed in other civil actions
generally. 66

V.

THE

CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT --

EQUAL PROTECTION

OF THE LAW

Since discretionary in forma pauperis has seldom afforded indigents
access to the divorce courts, a constitutionally-mandated right to such
proceedings must be established if indigents are to be assured access
to the divorce courts in every proceeding. Such mandate is supplied
by the equal protection clause6 7 which has been the basis for recent
Supreme Court decisions protecting indigents from deprivation of their
fundamental rights because of economic barriers created by the state.
The United States Supreme Court has dealt with questions of
6s
economic discrimination in various contexts. In Edwards v. California
the Supreme Court held a California statute prohibiting the importation of indigent persons to be unconstitutional. In a concurring opinion
Mr. Justice Jackson stated that:
[A] man's mere property status, without more, cannot be used by
a state to test, qualify, or limit his rights as a citizen of the United
65. The findings of a previous survey taken in 1967, concerning, in part, which
Pennsylvania legal aid societies take divorce cases are listed below:

(1) Those offices which would handle no divorce cases: Erie, Harrisburg,
Reading, Scranton, Williamsport.

(2) The Montgomery County legal aid office (in Norristown) will oniy
handle a divorce case if the husband is in the military service and the
commanding officer recommends a divorce. The only other type of
divorce case it will handle is one in which the husband is in jail for
some heinous crime.
(3) The Pittsburgh legal aid office will only handle divorce for a "good
purpose," for example, the welfare of the children.
(4) The Chester office only handles divorce cases for defendants and not
plaintiffs.
44 J. URBAN L. at 574-80.
The Pennsylvania Survey indicated that only one-fourth of the societies replying did not take divorce cases at all. However, this high percentage of societies taking
divorces may be explained by the fact that only thirteen of the twenty-one surveys
were returned, thus leading to the conclusion that eight which did not respond might
have done so thinking that a reply was not necessary since they did not handle divorces.
66. For example, the Community Legal Services, Inc., of Philadelphia, requires a
fifty dollar deposit from the indigent to insure his payment of the preliminary costs
(the initial complaint and service) which must be covered before leave to proceed in
forma pauperis in a divorce case can be requested. Greater deposits to cover costs are
required if the client is going to pay for all the costs himself, and not proceed in
forma pauperis. In addition clients will be discouraged from receiving free counsel
where the plaintiff's future spouse, assuming such person exist, could pay the costs and
counsel fees. Indicated by the responses to the Pennsylvania Survey, see note 21 supra.
67. A similar constitutional argument was presented to the Supreme Court in
Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968 (D.C. Conn. 1968). See note 3 supra.
68. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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States. "Indigence" in itself is neither a source of rights nor a
basis for denying them. The mere state of being without funds is
a neutral fact - constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed,
or color.

9

Of more importance, however, is the case of Griffin v. Illinois,"
wherein the Supreme Court held that when state procedures require
transcripts for criminal appellate review the state must provide the indigent prisoner with transcripts without cost. The Court stated:
Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike
is an age-old problem. .

.

. There can be no equal justice where the

kind of a trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.
Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review
as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts. 71
From this specific holding the Court formulated the doctrine that "when
a state acts to deny an individual basic civil rights, [as in the criminal
area] it must take affirmative steps, beyond the uniform application of
fee requirements to guarantee impoverished people equality before the
law."

72

The Supreme Court recently applied the Griffin doctrine in the administration of criminal justice area in Williams v. Illinois.78 In Williams, the Court held that the imprisonment of an indigent was a violation of the equal protection clause where, after serving the maximum
term provided by the penal statute, the indigent was forced to work off
69. Id. at 184-85 (concurring opinion of Justice Jackson). Consider also Harper
v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), where it was held that the
erection of financial barriers to voting violated the equal protection clause.
70. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
71. Id. at 16, 19.
72. Id. at 19. In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in reference to the indigent's inability to appeal in a criminal proceeding:
To sanction such a ruthless consequence, inevitably resulting from a money hurdle
erected by a State, would justify a latter-day Anatole France to add one more
item to his ironic comments on the "majestic equality" of the law. "The law, in
its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges,
to beg in the streets and to steal bread."
Id. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The Griffin reasoning has been applied to other situations involving indigent
criminal defendants being relieved from paying costs. See, e.g., Long v. District Court
of Iowa, 385 U.S. 194 (1966) (held that the state was required to provide a transcript free of cost to indigent habeas corpus petitioners) ; Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that the indigent has a right to court-appointed counsel
on appeal); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (cost of transcript requirement
for writ of error coram nobis is unconstitutional as to poor petitioners) ; Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (indigent defendants have a right to free transcripts
on appeal) ; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (filing fee requirement for habeas
corpus is unconstitutional as to poor petitioners) ; Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959)
(filing fee requirement in criminal appeal was held unconstitutional insofar as it barred
defendant from appealing his conviction). In Burns, the Court stated that:
There is no rational basis for assuming that indigents' motions for leave to appeal
will be less meritorious than those of other defendants. Indigents must, therefore, have the same opportunities to invoke the discretion of the Supreme
Court of Ohio.
360 U.S. at 257-58. See Comment, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the
Indigent, 56 GEO. L.J. 516, 540 (1968). See also Willcox & Blaunstein, The Griflin
Case - Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1957).
73. 38 U.S.L.W. 4607 (U.S. June 29, 1970).
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court costs and fines by remaining in prison. 74 As the Court pointed
out, Williams is only one step in the general trend begun by Griffin
"to mitigate the disparate treatment of indigents in the criminal process"
through the use of the equal protection clause. 75 The language of the
equal protection clause, however, does not restrict the scope of its protection to inequalities related to criminal proceedings, but, is broad
enough to be readily applicable to the disparate treatment afforded the
76
indigent in civil divorce proceedings.
The Griffin doctrine has been explicitly determined to be applicable to a divorce action in Jeffreys v. Jeffreys 77 where the New York
74. Id. at 4609. Although the Williams holding was limited to its particular facts
the Court broadly stated that:
rOInce the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy
its penological interests and policies, it may not then subject a certain class of
convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum
solely by reason of their indigency.
Id. at 4609.
The question of whether indigent persons can ever be incarcerated constitutionally for inability to pay court fines will be decided this term, since the Court
has granted the appeal of Preston A. Tate who was ordered to serve ninety days in
jail because he could not pay $425.00 in traffic fines. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1970,
at 26, col. 2.
75. Williams v. Illinois, 38 U.S.L.W. 4607, 4608 (U.S. June 29, 1970). The Court
cited as examples of this general trend Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1962) ; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
However, Justice Harlan in his dissent rejected the use of the equal protection clause
to void state statutes which utilize classifications based on suspect criteria or affect
fundamental rights when not justified by a compelling governmental interest. He
would prefer to rely on the protection afforded by due process. 38 U.S.L.W. 4607,
4614-16 (U.S. June 29, 1970). See note 96 infra for further comment on the due
process clause.
76. At least two members of the Supreme Court have explicitly stated that there
is no basis to limit the Griffin doctrine to criminal cases. Mr. Justice Douglas,
joined
by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in dissenting from a denial of certiorari in Williams v.
Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967), stated:
On numerous occasions this Court has struck down financial limitations on the
ability to obtain judicial review. . . . It is true that these cases have dealt with
criminal proceedings. But the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to criminal prosecutions. Its protections extend as well to
civil matters. I can see no more justification for denying an indigent a hearing
in an eviction proceeding solely because of his poverty than for denying an
indigent the right of appeal .

.

. the right to file a habeas corpus petition .

.

. or

the right to obtain a transcript necessary for appeal.
Id. at 1039-40.
Even Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Griffin, recognized that the equal
protection clause could not be so limited:
[I]f requiring defendants in felony cases to pay for a transcript [in criminal
appeals] constitutes a discriminatory denial to indigents of the right of appeal
available to others, why is it not a similar denial in misdemeanor cases or, for
that matter, civil cases?
It is no answer to say that equal protection is not an absolute and that in
other than criminal cases the differentiation is "reasonable." The resulting
classification would be invidious in all cases, and an invidious classification
offends equal protection regardless of the seriousness of the consequences.
351 U.S. 12, at 35. See also In re Garland, 39 U.S.L.W. 2029 (1st Cir. July 8, 1970),
where the court, in dicta, states that a substantial injury to a litigant due to court
costs will not be permitted, and the court will have to suffer the financial loss in such
cases rather than charge costs.
For a decision supporting the view that the doctrine of Griffin is inapplicable
to divorce actions, see Dugger v. Dugger, No. M-7377-68, at 11 (Super. Ct. of N.J.
Chancery Div., Jan. 30, 1970), discussed at note 134 infra.
77. 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
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Supreme Court held that the statutory imposition of publication costs
discriminated against indigents thus denying them equal access to the
courts guaranteed under the equal protection clause. The Jeffreys Court
carefully distinguished divorce litigation from other civil actions by
78
noting the state's fundamental interest in the marital relationship.
The court reasoned that the State had a "partnership interest" resulting
from its relationship to the married couple which was evidenced by
numerous statutes regulating the consummation and obligations of marriage and the state's constitutional mandate that divorce be granted by
79
Having emphasized this close relationship,
judicial proceeding only.
the court concluded:
Marriage is clearly marked with the public interest. In this State,
a marriage cannot be dissolved except by "due judicial proceedings". . . . We have erected by statute a money hurdle to such
dissolution by requiring in many circumstances the service of a
. This hurdle is an effective barrier
summons by publication . .
to Mrs. Jeffreys' access to the courts. The loss of access to the
courts in an action for divorce is a right of substantial magnitude
when only through the courts may redress or relief be obtained.
Such a right is, it seems to me, as basic as Griffin's right to appeal
and Mrs. Harper's right to vote. It is manifestly discriminatory
under Griffin standards to deprive Mrs. Jeffreys of that right while
affording it to others with money.
I hold that she has been denied the equal protection of the laws
°
guaranteed to her by the State and Federal Constitutions.
It seems clear therefore, that the right to a divorce involves several
substantial interrelated rights which should be equally protected regardless of wealth. In addition to the right of access to the courts, where they
serve as the only avenue of relief as discussed in Jeffreys, other more
basic human rights such as the right to select the marital partner of one's
choice and the right to raise a family, are also infringed by the inability
to obtain a divorce. A married individual, unable to obtain a divorce,
81
from
is prohibited by law from marrying the partner of his choice,
78. Id. at 1056. 296 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
79. [An action for divorce is fundamentally different from actions in contract
or concerning real property. The latter may be brought or not brought; they may
be settled out of court. But our State Constitution (Art. I, § 9) mandates that
divorces may be granted only by "due judicial proceedings." Furthermore, state
statutes dictates who may marry; by whom the marriage may be performed; the
obligations of the parties during marriage; the grounds for separation or divorce
and the obligations of the parties after the termination of the marriage. For all
purposes the State is very much a "partner" to a marriage and a "party" in a
matrimonial action.
Id. at 82.
80. Id. at 1056, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 87. For a brief analysis of Jeffreys, see 5 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1, 14-17 (1969).
81. In Pennsylvania, bigamy is punishable by a maximum of two years of solitary
confinement, at labor, and/or a $1,000 fine. PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4503 (1963). The
same penalty exists for a single person marrying the spouse of another under section 4504.
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procreating with the partner of his choice,8 2 and thus from living the
normal family life to which he would otherwise be entitled if he were
not barred from obtaining a divorce. 88 These rights of man have long
been recognized by the Supreme Court as "vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men, ' '8 4 that should be
afforded to all and not only to those individuals who can afford to pay
for them. Furthermore, when an indigent is unable to obtain a divorce
he is deprived of the right to take advantage of the numerous federal
statutes which are designed to relieve indigents from poverty.8 5
While it is evident that divorce costs discriminate against indigents,
thus depriving them of fundamental rights, it is a well settled constitutional doctrine that the equal protection clause does not prohibit a state
from making such distinctions among its citizens if the classification is
rationally related to the attainment of a legitimate government objective.86 Recently, however, the Supreme Court has taken a more restrictive approach toward state classifications in holding that where a
state classification is based on suspect criteria or affects fundamental
rights, it will be judged unconstitutional "unless shown to be necessary
82. In Pennsylvania, fornication is punishable by a fine of $100. PA. STAT. tit. 18,
§ 4506 (1963). Adultery is punishable by a maximum of one year imprisonment
and/or a $100 fine. PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4505 (1963).
83. This unfairness is illustrated by the case studies at p. 287 and note 15 supra.
84. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (state prohibitions of interracial
marriages held unconstitutional). In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942),
where state sterilization laws were held unconstitutional, the Court stated:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights
of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race ...
Id. at 541.
This right was also discussed by Mr. Justice Goldberg in his concurring
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where he argued the existence of fundamental rights protected by the Constitution which are not specifically
enumerated in the bill of rights.
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its
specific guarantees demonstrate that the right to marital privacy and to marry
and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights
specifically protected.
Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
In addition see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922).
85. The federal government provides widows and widowers with insurance
benefits when they have lost their spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1964). Thus where an
indigent couple is living together but cannot be married because one of them cannot
obtain a divorce, where one of them dies the other will not qualify for these insurance
benefits because he or she will not be a "widower" or a "widow."
The federal government helps provide low-rent housing to low income
families - this includes single persons only if they are elderly or displaced. Low-Rent
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1402(2), 1409 (1969). Thus indigent "families" composed
of a man and woman who are living together but not married because one cannot
get a divorce, will not qualify or will have difficulty qualifying under these federal
laws, since they are not husband and wife nor a family in the legal sense.
For other examples, see the case studies at note 15 supra.
86. Under this traditional standard, equal protection is denied only if the classification is "without any reasonable basis." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426
(1961) ; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) ; Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). See also Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 U.S.
573, 578 (1938).
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to promote a compelling governmental interest."87 In light of this expanding zone of equal protection, it is submitted that state cost requirements in divorce proceedings are not necessary to promote "compelling
governmental interests," and, since fundamental rights are being infringed the cost requirements are unconstitutional. This position requires an evaluation of the rationality and reasonableness of the purpose
underlying the enactment of the statutes which create the costs that
accompany a divorce action.
Some of the purposes which have been put forth as justifications
for the cost requirements in divorce proceedings are: (1) they raise
revenue; (2) discourage frivolous litigation; and (3) preserve the
family unit.8 8 While the cost requirements have a rational basis as
revenue raising devices - they undoubtedly generate revenue for the
treasury from those divorce litigants who are able to pay the fees this rational basis no longer exists when the cost requirements are
imposed upon indigent persons who are unable to pay them. Thus, it
becomes questionable whether the requirement that all persons seeking
divorces must pay these costs is a reasonable means of achieving the
legitimate end of fund raising. Even assuming, however, that procedural
divorce costs are a functionally sound method of raising funds, it would
seem to be a more reasonable approach to require only those who can
afford to pay them to do so, and to excuse those indigent persons who
are unable to pay the costs so that they may exercise their right of access
to the divorce courts.
Similarly, the state's contention that procedural costs effectuate
the purpose of deterring frivolous divorce claims - a legitimate state
interest - is erroneous since these costs are an irrational means of
achieving this purpose. The costs only deter indigents from obtaining
divorces, and do not deter a substantial segment of the community, thus
rendering the procedural rules under-inclusive. 89 Moreover, if indigents
are the only class sought to be deterred from bringing frivolous divorce
claims the setting of costs is clearly over-inclusive, since any theory that
all indigent divorce claims are per se frivolous is clearly contrary to
statistical evidenceY0 Whichever contention is being advanced, the
87. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In Shapiro, the Court ruled
unconstitutional a one year state residency requirement for public welfare recipients.
While the Court applied the "compelling interest" test to this classification affecting
the constitutional right to interstate travel, it also stated that such a regulation would
also fail under the less strict rational basis test. Id. a 634. See also McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964), where the Court in dealing with a racial classification stated that such a classification "will be upheld only if it is necessary, and not
merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy."
88. These hypothetical purposes for the state's establishing court costs were
discussed in appellant's brief in Boddie. The state of Connecticut, as appellee, did
argue that divorce costs were reasonably related to the legitimate state interests of
raising revenue, and reducing frivolous litigation. See note 3 supra.
89. See Comment, supra note 72, at 537, for a discussion of the inclusiveness
theory and court-imposed costs. See also Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d
17 (1948).
90. See notes 10, 11, 12 supra. See also the case studies in note 15 supra.
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legitimate purpose for requiring these costs is being effectuated by an
irrational means and therefore, the maintenance of these procedural costs
is a violation of the equal protection clause. Furthermore, even if procedural costs were a rational means of uniformly discouraging frivolous
divorce claims, there are many far more efficient means of accomplishing the same end without discriminatorily infringing upon the rights of
the indigent. Some of the possible remedies that would be more likely
to deter frivolous divorces are: (1) required marital counseling prior
to filing a divorce petition 9' (provided free to the indigent) ; (2) a more
realistic and defined basis upon which a divorce could be granted; and
(3) abuse of process prosecutions or perjury charges brought against
those who make frivolous claims and baseless allegations.
If the purpose of procedural cost requirements is to preserve the
family unit - a legitimate social concern - by deterring divorces, the
use of procedural costs to achieve this end suffers from the same deficiency present in their use to discourage frivolous divorces. Aside from
the fact that the costs only deter the indigent from divorce and leave
wealthier persons free to break up their families at will, surveys indicate that where divorces are unavailable the discontented indigent spouse
will, nevertheless, desert the family. 92 What is further inconsistent with
the realization of this purpose is that by denying divorce through prohibitive costs, both spouses are effectively prevented from remarrying
and thus forming a stable family unit where none previously existed. "°
Furthermore, some reasonable alternatives to the procedural cost requirement can be suggested that will also achieve the desired end of
family preservation. For example, longer marital waiting periods might
be required,94 and, free counselling and advisory service could be made
available to the indigent before and during marriage. 95
It can therefore be concluded that the state's use of divorce court
costs to enhance its alleged interests are irrationally related thereto and
an unreasonable means of achieving them in light of the available alternatives. Thus, there being no "compelling" government interest support91. See note 95 infra.
92. See note 6 supra.
93. See note 81 supra.
94. See Ploscowe, Sex and the Law, in THE FAMILY AND THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION 183 (E. Schur ed. 1964). This author stated:
Legislators have overlooked the elementary fact, that lax marriage laws and
procedures are one of the principal contributing factors in the demand for the
dissolution of marriage through divorce and annulment. If husbands and wives
were required to choose their mates more carefully, if the law made certain that
the choice of a husband or wife was a free one, made after mature reflection,
there would be . . . less need for the dissolution of marriages, through annulment
and divorce.
Id. at 187.
95. Id. at 191. It is Mr. Ploscowe's opinion that divorces should only be granted
after the husband and wife have undergone examination by a panel of experts whose
goal would be to adjust differences and save the marriage.
were deemed irreconcilable would the divorce be granted. Id.
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ing the employment of discriminatory court costs, it follows that they are
an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. It may also be argued that the present divorce structure constitutes a denial of due process by denying indigents, through
the creation of insurmountable procedural cost requirements, full access to
the courts for the redress of their grievances.9 6
VI.

THE PENNSYLVANIA

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT

In addition to the equal protection argument supporting a right to
in forma pauperis proceedings in divorce litigation, further support is
provided by the Pennsylvania Constitution. Article I, Section 11 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution provides in part:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him
in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due
course of97law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial
or delay.
Relying on this constitutional provision, Pennsylvania courts have
invalidated court rules requiring indigent plaintiffs to provide security
96. It can be argued that the financial barriers to divorce result in a denial
of due process with regard to the indigent. The Supreme Court in Chambers v.
Baltimore & 0. R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907), made clear that:
The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an

organized society, it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the
foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and most essential
privileges of citizenship.
The Supreme Court has firmly established that the right to seek redress in
the courts is a matter of due process. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377
U.S. 1 (1964); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). While these cases all dealt with group rights, it can
be readily argued that the Constitution makes no such distinction, and, indeed, is
primarily concerned with individual rights and liberties.
While this due process argument resembles the equal protection argument,
as plaintiffs in Boddie pointed out, such an argument does not require a determination
of unequal treatment which is necessary for a violation of equal protection.
The essential elements of due process of law are notice and an opportunity to be
heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adopted to the nature of the case
before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause.
12 AM. JUR. ConstitutionalLaw, § 573 (1938) (footnotes omitted).
It is submitted that the cost requirements of divorce effectively deprive the
indigent of such an "opportunity to be heard and defend" and thereby amount to a
violation of due process of law.
97. PA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
This provision is a paraphrase of Chapter XXI of Magna Carta which
stipulates :
To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse, or delay, right or justice. . ..
No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or
anywise destroyed; nor shall we go upon him nor send upon him, but by the
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
The Magna Carta was quoted by the Supreme Court in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
16-17 (1956), when it required Illinois to provide transcripts without cost to poor
persons appealing criminal convictions.
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for costs as a precondition to proceeding with divorce actions."8

How-

ever, a complete implementation of the word and spirit of this provision
would require the courts to invalidate all rulings, rules and statutes
which place a price tag on justice through the imposition of court costs
which force the indigent to forego his "remedy by due course of law"

a constitutional right to have justice administered by the courts.99
VII.

SOCIOLOGICAL

CONSIDERATIONS

In addition to the constitutional arguments in favor of a right to in

forma pauperis divorce proceedings there are various sociological arguments supporting such a right. They are based on the adverse effects on
the spouses, children and society in general which result from prohibiting
indigents access to the divorce courts.100 As stated previously, the indigent who is barred from divorce is faced with two alternatives: (1)
he can live at home discontented with his marital partner; or (2) desert
his family. Either alternative leads to obvious difficulties. The first alternative inevitably leads to family discord, arguments, violence and
other undesirable consequences. 10 1 The children, of course, receive the
brunt of such conditions. In fact, studies have indicated that such family
discord has a considerably greater adverse effect on the children than
when the family is broken through separation. 10 2 However, where the
couple continues to live together the family may be more economically
stable since the wife and children may be supported by the husband even
if that support must be obtained through a court order.
The second alternative - desertion - is similarly undesirable.
While the children are spared the family discord at home, frequently
the spouse remaining with the children is without support and is unable
to obtain a support order due to the deserting spouse's absence.' 0 Fur98. In Schade v. Luppert, 17 Pa. County Ct. 460, 462 (Lycoming County C.P.

1896), the court so held, reasoning that:

To [the indigent] the courts of justice are not open, becausg the court has
seen fit, by virtue of its ruling, to require of him something impossible for him
to perform.
Clearly this would be a denial of justice to the man who was so unfortunate
as to be too poor to comply with the order of the court.
See also Lutz v. Heasley, 12 Pa. Dist. 139 (Clarion County C.P. 1902); Jack v.
Administrators of McClure, 26 Pa. County Ct. 59, 62 (Clarion County C.P. 1901).
99. It could be argued that costs for the indigent be removed from all judicial
proceedings to enable the indigent to have equal access to the courts for all purposes,
but to so argue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
100. A policy argument similar to that discussed in this section was utilized in the
plaintiff's brief filed with the Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp.
968 (D.C. Conn. 1968). See note 3 supra.
101. See LANDIS, A COMPARISON OF CHILDREN FROM DIVORCED AND NoN-DIVORCED
UNHAPPY MARRIAGES, FAMILY LIFE COORDINATES 61 (July, 1962); Nye, Child
Adjustment in Broken and in Unhappy, Unbroken Homes, 19 MARR. & FAM. LIVING
356 (1957).
102. See Burchinal, Characteristics of Adolescents from Unbroken, Broken and
Reconstituted Families, 26 J. MARR. & FAM. 44 (1964).
103. The wife and children who have been deserted by their husband-father have
numerous avenues through court action for obtaining financial relief from him. Unfortunately, where the husband is no longer within the jurisdiction, and the wife is
indigent, it appears that these avenues are foreclosed. The Pena! Code of Pennsylvania
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thermore, there is the undesirable fact that separation may be ended
and begun again at the whim of the deserting party without formality,
thus adding further instability to the lives of the rest of the family. 104
It therefore seems evident that regardless of which of the two alternatives is chosen by the indigent, the results of the choice are most
likely to be considerably more undesirable to all concerned than the
results of a divorce. To further support this conclusion, studies have
indicated that divorce provides a favorable stability for both spouses and
children, and that the children's adjustment in divorce family situations
is no worse than the adjustment of children whose families are broken
due to other causes. 05 In addition to the above factors favoring divorce,
there is the most important point that a divorce frees both spouses and
gives them the opportunity to remarry. Where remarriage occurs, not
only does the new husband afford a likelihood of economic stability to
the family by supplying income which could take the family off public
assistance and welfare rolls, but his presence in the household undisputably adds to the emotional and educational stability of the wife and
children.' 0
Statistics have indicated that there is a strong likelihood
expressly conditions the initiation of a wife's or child's action for desertion and nonsupport - under which the court can order support payments by the husband and
imprison him for failure to comply - upon the husband's being within the limits of
the Commonwealth. PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4733 (1963). The wife and children can
bring civil in personam actions for support where the husband has neglected or
refused to support them. PA. STAT. tit. 48, § 131 (1965) ; PA. STAT. tit. 62, § 2043.31
et seq. (1968). The Civil Procedural Support Law has a broad provision for service
of process upon the out of state husband: "Every complaint and order may be served
by registered mail or by any adult person or by another manner provided by law."
PA. STAT. tit. 62, § 2043.36(d) (1968).
Even under this statute the indigent wife
who does not know where, her husband lives and who cannot afford publication
costs - assuming service by publication is both authorized by the statute and constitutional - is unable to maintain a civil action for support. The wife and children
can bring an in rem action for nonsupport against any property of the husband
remaining in the state. PA. STAT. tit. 48, § 134 (1965).

104. R.

CAVEN, THE AMERICAN FAMILY

(3d ed. 1963), where the author states:

The very fact that after a separation the marriage may be resumed without
formality adds to the instability. One separation may follow another, often being
in the nature of desertion by the father who moves out leaving the mother and
children without support. With longer periods of separation, but no legal termination of the marriage through divorce, temporary alliances or more permanent
common-law marriages may replace legal marriage.
Id. at 151.
105. See Burchinal, supra note 102.
Adolescents from broken [divorced or separated] families showed significantly
better adjustment than those from unhappy, unbroken families in relation to
psychosomatic illnesses, delinquency behavior, and parent-child adjustment. In
general, children from families broken by divorce did not have poorer adjustment
than children from families broken in other ways.
Id. at 45.
In this passage the author is relating the findings of a study by F. Ivan Nye,
supra note 101, at 356-61. Burchinal concludes that there is required a "revision of
widely held beliefs about the detrimental effects of divorce upon children." Burchinal,
supra note 102, at 50. See also Plant, The Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced
Parents, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROn. 807 (1944).
106. See Parker & Kleiner, Characteristics of Negro Mothers in Single-Headed
Households, 28 J. MARR. & FAM. 507, 512, where the authors conclude that:
[Tihe mother's psychological adjustment and achievement related attitudes exert
a depressing influence on the goal-striving behavior of her children. Thus, the
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that such remarriage will occur and be successful, 107 and have further
indicated that there is little likelihood that a broken indigent family
will be restored. 0 8
In addition to the more specific effects of denying divorces to the
indigent, there is also the more general sociological impact of denying
to the poor what the rich may easily obtain. As the late Robert F.
Kennedy once remarked, "[t]he poor man looks upon the law as an
enemy"; the practice of denying the indigent access to the courts in
matters as fundamental as divorce will have the tendency of reinforcing
their hatred of the "establishment."1 09 The inevitable result of the
growth of such attitudes would seem to be a disrespect for the law and
a refusal to abide by it in most areas of social behavior." 0 This overall
sociological problem and the more specific problems of the broken home,
illicit relationships and illegitimate children can be solved, at least to
some extent, by assuring the availability of divorces to indigent spouses.,
VIII.

PROPOSALS

The best method of assuring that the indigent achieves equal access
to divorce proceedings is to remove all the financial barriers which
female-headed household, so widespread in the Negro community, may have some

serious consequences for children raised in these homes.
It seems clear that both Negro mothers and children fare better emotionally
and educationally with the presence of a father in the household. Lystad, Family
Patterns, Achievements, and Aspirations of Urban Negroes, 45 SOCIOLOGY & SOC.
RESEARCH 281 (1961); Parker & Kleiner, Characteristics of Negro Mothers in
Single-Headed Households, 28 J. MARR. & FAM. 507 (1966). See also Locke, Predicting Marital Adjustment by Comparing a Divorced and A Happily Married Group,
12 AM. Soc. REV. 187 (1947) ; Locke & Klausner, Marital Adjustment of Divorced
Persons, 33 SOCIOLOGY & Soc. RESEARCH 86 (1948) ; Monahan, When Married Couples
Part: Statistical Trends and Relationships in Divorce, 27 Am. Soc. REV. 625 (1962).
107. About two-thirds of such divorces result in subsequent remarriage. W.
KEPHART, THE FAMILY, SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 596-97 (2d ed. 1966).
See
also P. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 82 (1959). See J.BERNARD,
REMARRIAGE: A STUDY OF MARRIAGE 269 (1956); W. GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE 335
(1956) ; N. COHEN, SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 60 (1964).
108. W. KEPHART, note 107 supra. See also F. HARPER & J. SKOLNICK, PROBLEMS
OF THE FAMILY 290 (1962).

109. Gold, The Poor and Divorce: Boddie v. Connecticut, 3 FAm. L.Q. 281, 286
(1969).
110. Judge Stamler in Suber v. Suber, No. M-2366-68, at 5 (N.J. Super., Aug. 25,
1969) (presently on appeal), stated:
It is not hard to understand the cynicism of the people of the ghetto towards
our legal system as an outlet for grievances and disputes. A person charged
with a criminal offense is brought before the bar of justice expeditiously. He is
given a free trial, free lawyer and, if necessary, free appeals. Yet a deserted
woman, who feels as imprisoned as a convict and who may be able to free society
of the burden of supporting her if she could remarry, is denied the relief of our
courts. It is unjust to give better treatment to those who break society [sic]
laws than to those who attempt to live by the rule of law and order.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added). See note 127 infra.
111. Judge Raymond Pace Alexander, elucidating the need for providing legal
services to the poor when he granted a charter to Community Legal Services, Inc., of
Philadelphia, In re: Community Legal Services, Inc. (Philadelphia County C.P. 4,
March Term 1966, No. 4968), stated:
Divorce for the poor is often impossible because of the legal costs involved.
Divorce poverty style is plain common "separation" and the spouse soon after is
taking up with another. Result: broken families that remain broken; denial of
opportunity for remarriage; illicit relationships and illegitimate children.
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have been erected as part of the divorce procedure in Pennsylvania."
Due to the particular nature of the establishment of these procedures
there are four levels upon which this step could be affected: (1) the
Court; (3) local courts; and
State Legislature; (2) the State Supreme
13
(4) the individual lower court judge.
The State Legislature has authorized the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to adopt rules of procedures to regulate divorce proceedings ;114
these rules have the force of statute." 5 The State Legislature has also
authorized local common pleas courts to adopt certain procedural rules
which do not conflict with the general rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court. 6 Thus, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not provided procedural rules in divorce, or specifically authorized the local
court to create divorce procedure, the common pleas courts control the
imposition of costs. 117
Under the present state of the law, however, the granting of in
forma pauperis proceedings in divorce litigation is not governed by
formalized rules on any of these levels, but is merely a matter of common
law governed by the discretion of the trial judge." 8 Unfortunately, our
Pennsylvania Survey has indicated that when such matters are left to
the discretion of the judges, in forma pauperis proceedings are rarely,
if ever granted. 119 Since this approach has not proved to be an adequate
solution to the indigent's difficulty in obtaining divorces and is unlikely
to be so in the future, it must be abandoned in favor of establishing in

112. The authors wish to acknowledge the practical assistance and advice of Mr.
Charles Platto, Esquire, University of Pennsylvania, B.A. 1966; University of Michigan, J.D. 1969; Member of the New York Bar; presently a Reginald Heber Smith

Fellow with Community Legal Services, Inc., of Philadelphia, whose assistance has
contributed greatly to the Proposal Section of this Comment.
113. See p. 288 supra.
114. The Act of June 21, 1937, P.L. 1982, No. 392, § 1, as amended and supplemented states:
[Tihe Supreme Court of Pennsylvania shall have the power to prescribe by
general rule the forms of actions, process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the
practice and procedure in civil cases at law and in equity for the courts of common
pleas and for the courts of quarter sessions of every county, for the county court
of Allegheny County, for the municipal court of Philadelphia, and for such other
courts having jurisdiction in civil actions as the General Assembly shall hereafter
establish: Provided that such rules shall be consistent with the Constitution of
the Commonwealth and shall neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant nor the jurisdiction of any of the said courts, nor affect
any statute of limitations....
PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 61 (1962) (emphasis added). The rules adopted by the Supreme
Court under the authority of the foregoing Act constitute the Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure, PA. R. Civ. P. 51.
115. Dombrowski v. Philadelphia, 431 Pa. 199, 245 A.2d 238 (1968); Iojeski v.
Quirk, 202 Pa. Super. 471, 198 A.2d 410 (1964).
116. PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 62 (1962).
117. See, e.g., PHILA. C.P.R. 1133(a)2(b), involving masters' fees being set by
local court, quoted at note 33 supra.
118. See p. 294 supra.
119. E.g., Community Legal Services, Inc., of Philadelphia, so indicated in their
response to the Pennsylvania Survey. See note 21 supra.
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forma pauperis divorce as a matter of right through statute or rule of
court with defined limitations and provisions.

A.
1.

Removal of Court Costs

Statutory Proposals

The most permanent and fundamental means of establishing a right
to in forma pauperis proceedings in indigent divorce litigation is the
adoption of a statute providing for the same. There are two principal
methods of statutory construction which could be utilized to exempt the
indigent from procedural costs in divorce actions. The first method is
to amend the existing statutes which either assess fees or authorize the
Supreme Court to adopt procedures or fees at its discretion, with an
introductory clause which expressly exempts the indigent from paying
the fee or fees covered by the statute.120 The other alternative is to adopt
a broad general statute which exempts the indigent from all costs and
fees resulting from his divorce litigation. An example of the latter
statute is the following proposal of the Community Legal Services, Inc.
of Philadelphia which could be enacted by the legislature of Pennsylvania:
Whenever any person by reason of indigency seeks relief from the
payment of any fees, expenses and costs provided for by law which
are payable to any court or clerk of court or sheriff in connection
with an action in divorce, (including without limitation any master's
fees, stenographer's fees, Bar Association fees), any court, upon
verified petition, setting forth the financial condition of such person,
which petition may be filed without fee, may in its discretion order
the payment of such fees, expenses and costs waived, and allow such
person to proceed in forma pauperis. Upon the entry of appearance
of counsel employed by or associated with a non-profit organization which has established eligibility standards for representation
of indigents, all such fees, expenses and costs shall be waived by
121
the clerk of court without the necessity of petition or court order.
Over one-half of the states and the federal courts have statutes or rules
of court providing for some type of in forma pauperis proceedings in
civil actions generally. 22 Unfortunately, not only do most of these states
120. An example of this type of statutory construction is the New Jersey statute
which requires the payment of a reference fee before a matrimonial action may be
approved for trial. N.J. STAT. tit. 2A, § 34-16 (1952), states:
Except in actions in forma pauperis, before any matrimonial action is approved
for trial the plaintiff or counterclaimant shall pay to the clerk of the superior
court, for the use of the state, the sum of $50 and in litigated actions the additional sum of $10.
121. While Community Legal Services, Inc., of Philadelphia, would like this
proposal to be enacted by the Pennsylvania legislature, it is presently part of a proposal to the Rules Committee of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to become a
Rule of Court; i.e., PA. R. Civ. P. 1137. This proposal, as well as the proposal found
at p. 319 infra, is the subject of a memorandum on in forma pauperis divorces which
is being submitted by Community Legal Services, Inc., of Philadelphia, to the Rules
Committee of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on file at Villanova Law Review office.
122. Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor
Persons in Civil Cases, 2 VALPARAISO U.L. REv. 21, 33 (1968).
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expressly .exclude divorce actions from the general provision 'for all
civil actions, 123 but most of the statutes which cover divorces are riddled
with exceptions and limitations which impair their effectiveness in divorce
litigation. For example, some states set their indigency qualification
standards so high as to make the effect of the statute nugatory. 124 In
addition all of the existing statutes are only partially effective because
the indigent is only relieved of some of the costs which are incurred
during divorce litigation.
The statutory proposal advised here should be directed at divorce
proceedings exclusively and must avoid the above pitfalls. The coverage must eliminate all costs eminating from divorce litigation. The exemption from costs must be extended to all those individuals who will
realistically be unable to pay for them. It is submitted that the best
approach is to allow an individual to proceed in forma pauperis whenever a legal aid society is conducting the divorce action since it has
already investigated and determined the indigent's financial status to
determine if he is qualified for their service. 125 Where such services
are not available some income range guidelines - at least as high as the
poverty income level set by OEO for the state of Pennsylvania - should
be established for determining qualification for costs exemptions. 126
123. Id. at 35. E.g., Georgia and Louisiana.
124. Id. at 34. In Arkansas, a poor person is one whose family and himself is not
worth more than ten dollars over and above necessary wearing apparel and exempting the subject matter of the action. Id.
125. For an example of the standards used in making such a determination, see
note 1 supra.
126. This approach was taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court in formulating
rule 1: 13-2 of the New Jersey Rules of Civil Practice. See note 134 infra. The
Office of Economic Opportunity's Guidelines for legal service programs indicate that
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was directed at providing equal opportunity
and equal justice for our country's poor. Some 35,000,000 persons are deemed to be
poor; i.e., having a family annual income under $3,000.00. This figure will vary with
each state as the eligibility figure is determined on a state-by-state basis by examining
the census figures for that state. In addition the income standard set will vary with
each organization and the demand for those services. Once the standard is set the
local organization may be more lenient than is required; in fact, it is required to be
flexible in its application of qualification standards. Guidelines for Legal Service
Programs, 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. 11 6700.10, .35 (1970).
For the indigency standard applied by the Legal Aid Society of Philadelphia,
see note 1 supra.
The federal courts have their own in forma pauperis statute which, because
of its ambiguity, creates some difficulty in determining whether a particular poor
person qualifies under it. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964), states that:
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement,
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or
appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a
person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security
therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and
affiant's belief that he is entitled to redress.
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in
writing that it is not taken in good faith.
(b) In any civil or criminal case the court may, upon filing of a like affidavit,
direct that the expense of printing the record on appeal, if such printing is
required by the appellate court, be paid by the United States, and the same shall
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Whichever type of statutory construction is utilized the indigent
will be relieved from the procedural expenses in divorce proceedings if
the above pitfalls are avoided. Unfortunately, due to the time consuming nature of the legislative process, especially in controversial areas
such as aid to the poor the desired statutory enactment may not reach
fruition in the near future, if at all. Therefore, it seems far better for
the judiciary to act now than for progress in this area to be lost in a
legislative quagmire. 12
2.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court And Local County Court
Rules of Procedure Proposals

The Supreme Court not only has the authority to promulgate rules
of procedure which will have the force of statute,1 2 8 but it also has the
authority to alter and/or suspend existing statutes which deal with probe paid when authorized by the Director of the Administrative Office of the

United States Courts.

(c) The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform
all duties in such cases. Witnesses shall attend as in other cases, and the same
remedies shall be available as are provided for by law in other cases.
(d) The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable
to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue,
or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.
(e) Judgment may be rendered for costs at the conclusion of the suit or action
as in other cases, but the United States shall not be liable for any of the costs
thus incurred. If the United States has paid the cost of a stenographic transcript
or printed record for the prevailing party, the same shall be taxed in favor ot
the United States.
The federal courts have held that "while permission [to proceed in forma pauperis]
should be freely granted where the affidavits are in the language of the statute, the
petition may thereafter be successfully challenged . . ." by establishing that the
petitioner can pay for the costs. Gift Stars, Inc. v. Alexander, 245 F. Supp. 697, 699
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). However, the federal courts do not require the petitioner to be
absolutely penniless to invoke the statute. See, e.g., Gift Stars, Inc. v. Alexander,
245 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 159 F.2d 61 (9th
Cir. 1946). The Supreme Court has so held in the case of Adkins v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1948), where it was stated:
[W]e think an affidavit is sufficient which states that one cannot because of
his poverty "pay or give security for the costs . . . and still be able to provide"
himself and dependents "with the necessities of life." To say that no persons
are entitled to the statute's benefits until they have sworn to contribute to payment of costs, the last dollar they have or can get, and thus make themselves
and their dependents wholly destitute, would be to construe the statute in a way
that would throw its beneficiaries into the category of public charges ...
Id. at 339, quoted in part in Gift Stars, Inc. v. Alexander, 245 F. Supp. 697, 699
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Many states have adopted the federal approach for determining indigenicy
qualifications. See, e.g., Sloatman v. Gibbons, 8 Ariz. App. 554, 448 P.2d 124 (1968).
See generally Silverstein, Eligibility for Free Legal Services in Civil Cases, 44 J.
URBAN

L. 549 (1967).

127. The quoted proposal is presently proposed as a rule for the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's adoption. Judicial action must at times be resorted to in the absence
of legislative action which is characterized by delay and ineffectiveness. See FREEDMAN,
note 18 supra. As the Court pointed out when it took judicial action in Suber v.
Suber, No. M-2366-68, at 5 (Super. Ct. of N.J., Chancery Div., Aug. 25, 1969)
(presently on appeal) : "this court would welcome legislative action in this area [in
reducing publication costs to the indigent]. But, in the absence of such action, this
Court sees an injustice which must be 'remedied.'" Contra, Boddie v. State of Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968 (D.C. Conn. 1968), see note 3 supra.
128. PA. R. Civ. P. 1121-36.
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cedural matters.' 2 9 Thus, the Supreme Court would have the authority
to suspend those rules and statutes which set filing fees, 30 cost of service
through sheriff' 3 ' or publication,' 3 2 and master's fees,'13 3 and also alter
or replace them with provisions providing for a right of in forma pauperis
proceeding in indigent divorce actions.' 3 4 The two alternative methods
of construction discussed in the.statutory section are also applicable to
procedural rules, i.e., the Supreme Court can either amend the existing
rules or adopt a general rule waiving fees and publication costs as a
matter of right. Either method is an adequate solution if all costs and
publication expenses are removed and the standard of indigency is sufficiently broad. Thus, the quoted proposal by Community Legal Services,
Inc., could well be adopted by the Supreme Court as a rule of court.
A similar approach might be undertaken through adoption of procedural rules in the local county courts. This change is easiest to accomplish and has the advantage of flexibility because it could be easily
altered by the local courts if it became cumbersome. However, since it
is unlikely that all the counties would adopt the same rule, this approach
suffers from one fatal defect - there would be a lack of uniformity in
the right to such proceedings throughout Pennsylvania. This lack of
uniformity would be at variance with the equal protection requirement
that indigents be afforded the same access to the courts as wealthier
persons wherever they reside in Pennsylvania.
129. PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 61 (1962). For the court's use of this power, see the
Acts of Assembly Suspended, PA. R. Crv. P. 1451 et seq. Significantly, the Court

has suspended a number of statutes in the divorce area dealing with masters, process
and publication, etc., PA. R. Civ. P. 1459, and replaced these with procedural rules of
court. PA. R. Civ. P. 1121.
130. PA. STAT. tit. 17, §§ 1589.1-.5 (supp. 1970) (filing fees).
131. PA. STAT. tit. 16, § 7861 (1956) (sheriff's fees).
132. PA. R. Civ. P. 1124(b) (service by publication).
133. PA. R. Civ. P. 1133 (a) (2) (appointment of master and fees).
134. An example of a broad general rule of court establishing in forma pauperis
proceedings is that adopted by New Jersey which states:
Except when otherwise specifically provided by these rules, whenever any
person by reason of poverty seeks relief from the payment of any fees provided
for by law which are payable to any court or clerk of court, any court upon the
verified application of such person, which application may be filed without fee,
may in its discretion order the payment of such fees waived. In any case in which
a person is represented by a legal aid society, an Office of Economic Opportunity
legal services project, the Office of Public Defender, or counsel assigned in
accordance with these rules, all filing fees shall be waived by the clerk without
the necessity of a court order.
N.J.R. Civ. P. 1:13-2 (The rules governing the courts of the State of New Jersey
became effective Sept. 8, 1969).
The language of this rule has been interpreted as providing state payment of
costs only for fees which are payable to the court or clerk of court and thus publication charges set by and payable to newspapers are not payable by the state. Duggar
v. Duggar, No. M-7377-68, at 5 (Super. Ct. of N.J., Chancery Div., Jan. 30, 1970).
The result of this omission was to burden the plaintiffs in divorce actions whose
spouses had left the jurisdiction with fees for service (newspaper charges) while
plaintiffs whose spouses lived in the jurisdiction would be able to serve them through
sheriff's service without charge. This discrimination was held to violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution resulting in a New Jersey Superior Court's order
that the state is to pay the publication costs charged to the indigent plaintiff in a
divorce action. Suber v. Suber, No. M-2366-68 (Super. Ct. of N.J., Chancery Div.,
Aug. 25, 1969). See p. 316 infra.
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Allocation of the Indigent's Divorce Costs

Regardless of which of the above three approaches is pursued in
order to effectuate a general right to an in forma pauperis divorce proceeding without cost, some consideration, based upon the assumption
that the structure of divorce proceedings will remain relatively unchanged, must be given to the allocation of the procedural costs incurred
by the indigents' divorce litigation.13 5 Filing fees and sheriffs' service
fees will have to be absorbed by the state, 18 6 but since they are a relatively minor expenses the financial burden would be insignificant. Masters'
and stenographers' fees, on the other hand, are a major cost of divorce
proceedings and several alternatives are available to meet such costs.
The masters themselves could be required to take a certain percentage
of indigent cases without charge. Another alternative would be to have
lawyers volunteer their services as masters. Unfortunately, this is impractical since most attornies are inexperienced in handling divorce proceedings. One method which has been used in several counties is to have
the judge take the case himself and not appoint a master. 3 7 While this
solves the cost problem, it requires a greater time commitment by the
judge who, in many counties, is already burdened by a serious backlog of
cases. Finally, a last alternative is that the entire cost be absorbed by
the state. While this alternative would result in higher taxes to meet
the considerable additional expense to the state, the burden of this expense is more appropriately placed on the public than on the masters
or the practicing members of the bar.
1.

Publication -

A Special Problem

Most costs arising from divorce actions are directly controlled by
the courts and can be waived by statute or rule without the expenditure
of funds from the state treasury. Publication costs, however, are unique
in that while they are required by the courts they are assessed by the
newspapers and will require an "out of pocket" expenditure by the state
to pay publication costs if the divorce courts are to be opened to indigent
divorce plaintiffs whose spouses are not subject to direct service. Due
to the uniqueness of this procedural cost a closer examination of publi135. While it is not the purpose of the Comment to expound upon procedural
changes which would reduce the cost to the state in processing indigent divorces, it is
important to note that procedural changes would reduce the ultimate burden on the
taxpayer. Costs could be greatly reduced by providing for summary divorce proceedings for indigents where the divorce is uncontested or where the defendant spouse
has deserted his family.
136. There is some question whether the state or county should absorb the additional cost of indigent divorce litigation. The traditional argument that the county
should pay the cost since its citizens are causing the expenditure and that it is unfair
to pass the burden of one county over to another through state taxation could undoubtedly be raised. However, since the procedural rules are ultimately created on
a state level, the taxation to pay for this procedure should be administered at the
state level.
137. See Pennsylvania Survey, note 21 supra.
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cation as a procedure is necessary before a proposal can be offered to
alleviate this expense.
The importance of notice to all parties in a judicial proceeding has
received considerable emphasis by the Supreme Court. In Mullane v.
Central Hanover B.&T. Co., the Court stated:
An elementary fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections. 13 8
However, the Supreme Court has done little more than set down general
guidelines as to what constitutes proper notice, 189 and as long as the
method of giving notice chosen by the individual state meets these guidelines and is just and reasonable considering the proceeding for which
it is used,'140 it will meet the requirements of due process. Thus, the
procedural aspects of notice are completely within the states' jurisdiction,
and, so long as the method of notifying all parties has due regard for the
practicalities and peculiarities of a given case it will not be condemned.14'
Pennsylvania, along with many other jurisdictions, 1 42 has chosen newspaper publication as the method of notifying defendant spouses who have
left the jurisdiction, or who are otherwise unable to be served per143
sonally.
In New Jersey, a state which utilizes the publication method of
giving notice, the courts were recently faced with the problem of preventing publication costs from overburdening the indigent divorce plain138. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1949), citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940);
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914) ; Priest v. Trustees of Las Vegas, N.M., 232
U.S. 604 (1914) ; Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900), cited as controlling on this
point in Sinadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339-40 (1969), quoted in
Jackel v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 993, 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Madio v. Madio,
256 Md. 807, 259 A.2d 524, 527 (1969).
139. In Mullane, the Court stated two specific guidelines:
The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 . . . and it must afford a reasonable time
for those interested to make their appearance, Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 ...
and cf. Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71 ....
339 U.S. at 314. Cited in Young v. Bunny Bazaar, Inc., 107 N.J. Super. 320, 258
A.2d 158, 160-61 (1969) ; Rudinoff v. Byrne, 101 N.J. Super. 29, 242 A.2d 880, 886-87
(1968). See also State v. Wenof, 102 N.J. Super. 370, 246 A.2d 59, 62 (1968),
which stated:
"No fool-proof system of giving notice exists. Since perfection is unattain-

able, the best one can hope for is the creation of methods reasonably calculated
to produce the desired result without imposing unrealistically heavy burdens on

the party charged with the duty of notification." Gellhorn and Byse, Administrative Law 852 (4th ed. 1960). There is always a risk that notice may not reach
the intended person, but this is not the test for legal sufficiency. The test, is
rather, whether the notice was reasonably calculated to reach the intended parties.
State by Parsons v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 305-06, 74 A.2d 565 (1950)
Mullane v. Central Hanover B. & T. Co., 339 U.S. 306 . . . (1949).
140. 339 U.S. at 315; citing American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911).
141. 339 U.S. at 314, 315.
142. E.g., Connecticut, see note 3 supra; New Jersey, see p. 316 infra; New
York, see note 77 supra.
143. PA. R. Civ. P. 1124(b). See note 27 supra.
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tiff. In Suber v. Suber,'4 the state was ordered to pay the publication
costs, which amounted to $60, to the indigent plaintiff in a divorce action.
The court utilized the equal protection clause to declare unconstitutional
publication charges to indigent divorce plaintiffs, which resulted from
New Jersey's requirement of notice by publication. 145 New Jersey, being
one of the most liberal states in this field, also provides for indigent in
forma pauperis proceedings in divorce actions by rule of court which
waives all court costs. 146 However, prior to the Suber case the indigent
was required to publish notice of a divorce action in order that the
plaintiff, who was out of the jurisdiction, would be given the notice required by due process.
The Suber court, in applying the Griffin doctrine, 147 ruled that where
the state provides for in forma pauperis divorces, it must provide all
indigent's with the same opportunity to obtain a divorce. 48 To force
some indigents - those whose spouse is not subject to direct service to pay publication charges while the others receive free service provided
by the state, is an unreasonable distinction which restricts basic human
rights and is thus violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 49 It is submitted that an unconstitutional discrimination also
occurs in those states where court fees, as well as publication costs, are
assessed against the indigent, since the indigent alone is denied access
to the court while the more affluent are not."," The discrimination complained of in Suber is more subtle due to the fact that New Jersey has
taken action to relieve the indigent from court fees and costs.
If the premise is adopted that indigent relief from publication costs
is constitutionally mandated and that the state must pay the cost of publication, some discussion of alternative notice requirements which would
relieve the state of the burden of publication cost seems warranted.','
Since it is most unlikely that newspapers will undertake a voluntary
reduction of publication charges, 52 there are two available alternatives.
144. No. M-2366-68 (Super. Ct. of N.J., Chancery Div., Aug. 25, 1969). This
case is presently on appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
145. Id. at 5.
146. See note 134 supra.
147. See p. 299 supra.
148. Suber v. Suber, No. M-2366-68, at 5 (Super. Ct. of N.J., Chancery Div.,
Aug. 25, 1969).
149. Id. at 4-5. The case of Dugger v. Dugger, No. M-7377-68 (Super. Ct. of
N.J., Chancery Div., Jan. 30, 1970), explicitly rejected the application of the Griffin
doctrine in a divorce proceeding. In Dugger, the court rejected the indigent wife's
motion for an order forcing the clerk of the Superior Court, the State of New Jersey,
or the Essex County Welfare Board to pay newspaper publication costs resulting
from her in forma pauperis divorce proceeding on the grounds that the allegation of
indigency was conclusionary and lacked the requisite specificity to qualify her for
such relief even if the state was constitutionally required to pay publication costs.
150. See pp. 298-306 supra.
151. Generally this Comment is not concerned with the adequacy or inadequacies
of the divorce procedures currently in force in Pennsylvania.
152. The New Jersey court in Suber v. Suber, No. M-2366-68 (Super. Ct. of
N.J., Chancery Div., Aug. 25, 1969) (presently on appeal), most properly pointed
out that:
The meaning of this opinion should not, however, be misconstrued. It is not
intended as a condonation of the hypocrisy of the fourth estate. This entire
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The easiest alternative is to reduce the number of publications currently
required under Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure from three to
one.'15

This will directly reduce the costs to the state by two-thirds.

The second alternative is to altogether abandon the use of publication as
a means of meeting the notice requirements of due process.
The legislative and judicial reasoning in support of publication appears to be that the newspapers afford a medium of communication to
thousands of persons, thus the legal notice is likely to come to the attention of the defendant, and, in addition, the cost to the plaintiff is comparatively inexpensive. The position that publication, as a means of
notifying the defendant, is comparatively inexpensive is irrelevant to the
indigent who cannot afford to pay this fee.
The position that legal notices are likely to be read by the defendant
also seems doubtful. The Supreme Court in Mullane refused to sanction
publication as a reliable means of notifying the beneficiaries of a trust
where the trustees were conducting a hearing concerning the pooling of
the trust.
Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper,
and if he makes his home outside the area of the newspaper's normal
circulation the odds that the information will never reach him are
54
large indeed.
It is only common sense which makes one realize that only a miniscule
percentage of a newspaper's readers will read or even browse through
the fine print of the classified section - the section where the legal
notices are most often located - unless they are looking for something
in particular.' 55 The Supreme Court in Mullane espoused this view in
question [that of the court's forcing the indigent to pay publication costs] would
be moot if the same newspaper which screams with selfrighteous indignation-at
the injustices practiced on the poor was to waive publication costs on certification
of indigency by the Legal Services Corporation.

Newspapers make a large portion of their profits on legal advertising, in
comparison with that large amount of business, the number of in forma pauperis
divorces is miniscule. The number of those cases requiring publication is still
smaller. This cost could easily be absorbed.
Id. at 5.
If the newspapers refused to provide free space, as is most likely, they might
be induced to give a percentage discount to indigents taking out legal notice ads as
they do for church advertisements.
153. As was noted in Dugger v. Dugger, No. M-7377-68, at 2, 5 (Super. Ct. of
N.J., Chancery Div., Jan. 30, 1970), New Jersey has recently reduced the number of
required publications from four to the two publications currently required by N.J.R.
Crv. P. 1:13-2. See note 135 supra.
154. 339 U.S. at 315.
155. The results of a survey conducted by Carl J. Nelson, Research Inc., ot
Chicago, Illinois, to determine the percent of readers of the Philadelphia Bulletin
newspaper who read the "Divorce Suits Begun" section of the Bulletin's Sunday
edition are the following: 2% of the men reading the paper read that section; 15%
of the women reading the paper read that section; 1% of the boys reading the paper
read that section; less than 1% of the girls reading the paper read that section.
The survey was taken of seven hundred Bulletin readers in the Bulletin's circulation
area on Sunday, April 29, 1970. While this percentage seems to be fairly high, it
must be considered that it is likely that a deserting spouse will not be in the same
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its concern for protecting the property rights of the beneficiaries. The
Court stated:
Publication may theoretically be available for all the world to see,
but it is too much in our day to suppose that each or any individual
beneficiary does or could examine all that is published to see if
something may be tucked away in it that affects his property
interests. 156
Having discredited publication as a means of notifying defendants
who are not subject to direct service, the question arises as to what alternatives can be adopted without violating due process. The Supreme
Court has indicated that as long as the alternative means of notifying
the defendant is a method which would be utilized by a person who
wanted to notify the defendant, due process will not be violated. 15 7 All
the Court requires when using such an alternative means is that:
Where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the
home notice than
form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring
58
other of the feasible and customary substitutes.1
Thus an alternative to publication could be adopted by state statute or
court rule so long as the new procedure was not substantially less likely
to notify the defendant of the pending suit. 159 An example of such a
procedure would be to allow indigents who are unable to locate their
spouse to post notices at the city hall and other central locations, and
send letters of such notice to the relatives or friends of the defendant
spouse, if their addresses are known. 160 The Community Legal Services,
newspaper circulation area as the spouse he has deserted, and thus the likelihood of
the deserting spouses reading the notice is not measured by this survey.
156. 339 U.S. at 320.
157. Id. Note that in cases of indigents' divorce proceedings the plaintiff spouse
would usually like nothing better than to notify the defendant in the hopes that he
would attend the proceedings and subject himself to a court order requiring him to
pay the costs of the proceedings or child support. See notes 35 & 103 supra.
158. Id.
159. The Supreme Court in Mullane was attacking publication as an ineffective
means of notifying interested beneficiaries of a trust that there would be a judicial
settlement of accounts for the purpose of pooling their trust with other small trust
estates. The Court ruled that due process was not violated as to those beneficiaries
whose names and addresses were not known and therefore not used in the newspaper
ad, but that due process was violated as to those beneficiaries whose names and
addresses were known but not listed. The Court stated:
This Court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publication as a customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not reasonably possible
or practicable to give more adequate warning. Thus it has been recognized that
in the case of persons missing or unknown employment of an indirect and even
a probably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates
no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights.
Id. at 317. Thus the court impliedly recognizes that where the defendant's location
is unknown notice is futile and that publication is merely a "stab in the dark" at
notifying the defendant.
160. A means of notice less thorough than that suggested in the text has been
deemed satisfactory by the Supreme Court. In Anderson National Bank v. Luckett,
321 U.S. 233, 244 (1944), a Kentucky statute authorizing the posting of a notice at
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Inc., of Philadelphia has put forth the following proposal as a substitute
for publication:
If service cannot be made under subdivision (a) (1) or (a) (2) of
this rule and has not been made under subdivision (a) (3) of this
rule, and the sheriff has made a return or affidavit of "Not Found,"
the plaintiff, without reinstatement of the complaint, shall have the
right to substitute service by public posting and registered mail.
The prothonotary, upon the filing of a praecipe for substitute service,
shall write on the complaint "Substitute Service Directed." Substitute service shall be made by the sheriff posting a notice on a bulletin board at the county court house set aside for such purpose.
Such notice shall remain posted for a period of not less than three
weeks. In addition, the sheriff shall send the defendant a notice
of the pendency of the action by registered mail to his last known
residence set forth in the complaint.' 0 '
C. Removal of Counsel Fees
Assuming the indigent was relieved of all costs which flow from his
divorce proceeding and that these costs were absorbed by the state, all
of this is to no avail unless he receives adequate legal counsel. Since
the indigent needs counsel to litigate his divorce and he cannot afford
the normal legal fees'6 2 - which are usually higher than the total
amount of other costs - he must be provided with free legal counsel. A
ready means of providing for free counsel is to use the existing services
of the legal aid societies. 16 3 However, certain policy changes must be
made to allow legal aid societies to take divorce cases and to require
the county court house to notify inactive depositors that their bank accounts would

escheat to the state was upheld. The Court stated:

We cannot say that the posting of a notice on the door of the court house in a
Kentucky county is a less efficacious means of giving notice to depositors in banks
of the county-than publication in a local newspaper ...
Another example of an inexpensive means of publicizing divorce actions
through a means other than the traditional public 'newspaper is that used for all
litigation in Nashville, Tennessee. In that state the supreme court has approved
publication of notice in a private weekly newspaper called the Nashville Record. The
approximate cost for any divorce litigant is $7.50 for publishing proper notice. While
many business and law firms receive this paper on a subscription basis, it is very
difficult to imagine that an indigent defendant would even obtain a copy of the paper
(which costs thirty cents), much less read through the notices.
161. This is the first section of a two part proposal for adoption as a rule of court
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (see p. 310 supra for the second part of the
proposal). It is proposed that the present rule 1124(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules
of Civil Procedure be suspended and that it be replaced with the quoted provision.
The text of the first portion of the existing publication procedural rule is set forth
at note 27 supra. Both of these proposals are the subject of a memorandum on in
forma pauperis divorces which is being submitted by Community Legal Services, Inc.,
of Philadelphia, to the Rules Committee of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on file
at Villanova Law Review Office.
162. See the Pennsylvania Survey, note 21 supra, which indicates that counsel
fees can run upwards of three hundred dollars in addition to costs.
163. Where there are no legal aid societies, counsel can be provided through the
court's appointment of private attorneys. Appointment in divorce cases is currently
being utilized in Lehigh County despite the existence of legal aid societies. Such a
procedure results in a lower quality representation to indigents in divorce litigation
because most of the appointed attorneys are not as experienced in divorce practice as
legal aid attorneys would be if they were taking divorce cases regularly.
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them to do so without any charge to, or security deposits for costs being
demanded of, the indigent client. In addition, more funds must be made
available to the societies to enable them to meet the increased costs
generated by this divorce litigation.
The first step toward the participation of legal aid societies in
indigent divorce litigation could be accomplished through the authority
of the Office of Economic Opportunity which supplies all or most of the
funds given to the various legal aid societies. While OEO has the ultimate authority over the policies and programs of legal aid societies,
their present standards merely establish generalized criteria for legal
aid programs. 64 However, OEO could tighten up its standards and
require the legal aid societies of Pennsylvania and other states, on a
local society basis, to take divorce cases under the penalty of withholding federal funds from their programs. 65 This would enable the societies
to take divorce actions, because the bar associations and boards of trustees would be economically compelled to comply with this OEO requirement.
In addition the bar association could be encouraged to change their
position of discouraging legal aid societies from taking indigent divorce
cases. This can most easily be accomplished by reminding these associations that to place the financial interests of its members over the interests of justice is contrary to the canons of ethics which have been
promulgated by the American Bar Association and entrusted to the local
bar associations for enforcement. 166 The Code of Professional Responsibility has expressly established certain ethical considerations concerning the duty of lawyers to support programs providing legal aid to the
underprivileged. It states that:
Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional
workload, should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged. The rendition of the legal services to those unable to pay
reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer, but
the efforts of individual lawyers are often not enough to meet the
need. Thus it has been necessary for the profession to institute
additional programs to provide legal services. Accordingly, legal
aid offices . . . and other related programs have been developed,
and others will be developed, by the profession. Every lawyer should
67
support all proper efforts to meet this need for legal services.1
164. See note 54 supra.
165. Most of the legal aid societies have developed independently, frequently
through action by the local bar association. Thus, OEO, in addition to setting down
a general uniform policy (see note 59 supra) requires the local legal aid society,
when applying for federal funds, to design a program suitable to the needs of the
community. 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. 1 6705.05 (1970). Most legal aid societies have
some sort of governing body to make these policy decisions. In Philadelphia the
charter of Community Legal Services, Inc., requires the board of trustees to perform
this function.
166. See the preliminary statement to the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 (1970), which went into effect on January 1, 1970. Rule 205 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure automatically adopts as rules of court the canons of
ethics as they are approved by the American Bar Association.
167. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, E.C. 2-25, at 6 (1970).
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If OEO sets down specific guidelines concerning the participation of
legal aid societies in indigent divorces, the cooperation of local bar associations would not be absolutely essential to obtaining indigent divorce
counsel, but their approval would greatly facilitate matters. Thus it is
hoped that local bar associations will alter their position and encourage
legal aid societies to provide counsel for indigents who desire to obtain
a divorce.
The second step which might be taken to provide for legal aid
society participation in indigent divorce litigation is to increase the legal
aid societies' resources - funds, facilities and personnel - so that they
are adequately equipped to take divorce cases without creating undue
pressure upon other community demands for legal services. 168 More
federal, state and local aid must be provided for these societies to enable
them to undertake the new influx of divorce cases. A failure to provide
these resources will cause the societies to discourage indigents from proceeding with their divorce claims.
D.

Summary and Conclusions

It is the thesis of this comment that the following proposals be
adopted by the bodies to which they are addressed in order to effectuate
the goal of providing divorce proceedings without cost to the indigent.
I.

Pennsylvania must establish in forma pauperis proceedings in divorce actions and make them available to the indigent as a matter
of right.
A. The proceedings must relieve the indigent from all costs and fees
arising from the divorce action.
(1) The State of Pennsylvania must absorb the costs entailed in
affording the indigent divorces without costs.
(2) The State of Pennsylvania should reduce its costs by revising the divorce procedures in Pennsylvania. E.g., Publication should be abolished as a required method of notifying
defendants who cannot be served directly.
B. The State of Pennsylvania must expressly provide that an indigent will qualify for a free divorce if he is represented by a legal

168. One of the functions of the Office of Economic Opportunity is to supply
funds for research projects which will increase legal service to the poor at a lower
cost. One such project, entitled the Computer Assisted Legal Service Project has
been experimenting - quite successfully - with using computers to interview clients.
The computers supply information and answer the client's basic questions through a
television screen; the client's responses are received through a key-punch board.
Immediately after the interview the computer automatically files the client's record
and prints the initial documents necessary for proceeding with the divorce. Such documents include a summary of the case for the attorney, a letter to the client giving him
relevant instructions and legal pleadings (affidavits and orders). GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
BUSINESS, THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, A PROGRESS REPORT: COMPUTER ASSISTED
LEGAL SERVICES PROJECT (December 1969). Such programs may provide the ultimate
solution to legal aid societies being under-staffed and under-financed.
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aid society or if he earns less than a predetermined poverty level
income.
II. Free legal counsel must be provided to indigents seeking divorces
through in forma pauperis proceedings.
A. The Office of Economic Opportunity must require all legal aid
societies receiving federal funds to handle the divorce cases of indigents who would otherwise qualify for free counsel.
B. The local bar associations must do all in their power to support
and encourage the legal aid societies to take indigent divorce
cases.
C. The legal aid societies must give equal priority to divorce litigation services,
D. Local, state and federal aid and cooperation must be increased
to enable the legal aid societies to realistically function with the
increased case load that will result from divorce litigation.
Hopefully, these proposals will be adopted by those to whom they
are directed, thus eliminating costs and counsel fees from indigent divorce proceedings. The effect of these reforms will be to remove all
financial barriers from the indigent's path to obtaining a divorce, thus
affording him the same opportunity to utilize our courts as the more
affluent citizen and to live, consistent with the law, either singly or with
the spouse of his choice. 109
Richard W. Hollstein
Michael R. Stiles
169. This conclusion is supported by the principles behind the Economic Opportunity Act, which is based on the following findings and statement of purpose:

Although the economic well-being and prosperity of the United States have
progressed to a level surpassing any achieved in world history, and although

these benefits are widely shared throughout the Nation, poverty continues to be
the lot of a substantial number of our people. The United States can achieve its
full economic and social potential as a nation only if every individual has the
opportunity to contribute to the full extent of his capabilities and to participate
in the workings of our society. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States

to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty in this Nation by
opening to everyone the opportunity for education and training, the opportunity

to work, and the opportunity to live in decency and dignity. It is the purpose of
this Act to strengthen, supplement, and coordinate efforts in furtherance of that
policy. It is the sense of the Congress that it is highly desirable to employ the
resources of the private sector of the economy of the United States in all such
efforts to further the policy of this Act.
42 U.S.C. § 2701 (Supp. 11 1966). See note 59 supra.
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